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ABSTRACT 
 
Democracy can be a useful tool in Africa. It can open channels for foreign aid and 
ultimately development. Many African countries have struggled with the changes 
and expectations that democracy brings. They have opted for authoritarian 
regimes or one party state regime. Zimbabwe and Kenya represent some of 
these countries. Such countries have been unable to promote or perfectly place 
liberal democracy within their societies. The most salient issue in the 
democratization process of Africa has been the post colonial state. Transitions 
into democracy have not always gone well at all in fact many transitions remain 
stagnant. 
This research investigates the problems surrounding the attainment of 
democracy in Africa, using the cases of Kenya and Zimbabwe. It seeks to 
understand the obstacles and challenges to the democratization processes in the 
two countries by focusing on the 2007/2008 contested elections as well as 
previous elections, and the attempts by external actors to deal with the results of 
the elections. 
The citizens of Kenya and Zimbabwe have both been affected and impacted by 
the lack of democracy that has existed in each country. This research also 
investigates the role of citizen participation in the electoral process. For both 
countries to succeed in all regards there is a pressing need for regime change 
and institution building. 
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Chapter 1 
1.1 Introduction and Background of the study 
 Post colonial transitions have not come with ease to many African countries; this 
has been a contributing factor in failing to lay solid foundations for democracy. 
The colonizers’ structures still echo in many of these countries.  Bratton and Van 
de Walle (1994:454) suggest that contemporary political changes are conditioned 
by mechanisms of rule embedded in the ancient regime. They state that 
authoritarian leaders in power for long periods of time establish rules about who 
may participate in public decisions and the amount of political competition. This 
has been the case in Zimbabwe and not so much in Kenya’s case.  The idea of 
the post-colonial state in Africa offers some challenge in building democratic 
states. According to Bayart (1993:8) one of the characteristics of the peripheral 
zone is that the indigenous state is weak, moving from a colonial existence to a 
state with weak autonomy referring to the neo-colonial situation. The grafting of 
the state has been a failure; accounts of the different manifestations of instability 
and political coercion bear witness to this. Bayart (1993:60) further says that in 
Africa as else where the state is a major source of inequality. This alludes to the 
fact that the state as Africans know it is an import and its development was aided 
by colonization. 
 
Africa has gone through experiences and experiments with democracy, some of 
which have resulted in civil wars and violence. According to Bratton and Van de 
Walle (1994:453) though democratisation is clearly incomplete in Africa, it has 
exposed and discredited military and one-party regimes few of which are likely to 
survive intact .This is  echoed  in countries such as Zimbabwe and Kenya which 
have been exposed and discredited. Some African countries such as Botswana 
have managed political reforms and transitions of a democratic nature. Botswana 
has had a good democratic experience.  Democracy has not been easily 
achievable in Africa as whole; the cases of Zimbabwe and Kenya demonstrate 
this. 
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As stated above the historical context has played a role in the uneasy transitions 
of many African countries. Kenya achieved independence in 1963 and Zimbabwe 
in 1980 but neither country is closer to long term prosperity or being full fledged 
democracies. There is a lot one can deduce from Kenya and Zimbabwe’s post 
colonial transitions. Why is Kenya not ahead of Zimbabwe considering the length 
of independence? Perhaps the difference and similarities of these transition 
processes can suggest answers. 
 
Kenya and Zimbabwe lend themselves to a comparison of adjustment strategies 
for several reasons.  They both share a comparable level of state formation with 
the state playing a critical role in determining and implementing adjustment 
policies. They also have identifiable adjustment strategies which differ in regard 
to state involvement and the scope of state action in the economy. They have 
both embarked on a path of foreign borrowing. They have both struggled with 
their adjustment policies. Since their independence, they have both increased 
their economic and financial links to the developed world. Both countries have 
experienced growth in manufacturing and industrial sectors Lehman (1990:39).  It 
does seem in both cases that the colonizers never entirely left, they still had a 
grasp on the successes and failures in both countries. According to Gordon 
(1981:37) both Kenya and Zimbabwe, at independence had inherited economic 
and social structures that had been shaped by white settlers. One would say that 
these structures were perceived to have been vital in the reconstruction of both 
countries. Similarly Gordon (1981:38) says both the countries leaders at 
independence shared the belief that the inherited economic structures, while 
creating certain constraints also provided opportunities that could be harnessed 
in the drive for development. If these respective countries had not received 
outside help they would have struggled but even with outside help both countries 
continue to struggle, could democracy be the solution? 
Democracy in Africa is as varied as the ever changing forms of government in 
more than fifty sovereign states. Democracy in Africa is an experimental process 
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in a new generation of countries, Sklar (1983:12). Kenya and Zimbabwe are not 
new to democracy; both countries have always preferred a one party state 
without party competition. Recent portrayals of a democratic nature in both 
countries are still on a shaky ground, particularly democratic elections. Some 
scholars have stated that elections are largely insignificant to democratization. 
This research report will show that there is still a need for elections to uphold 
democracy. Lindberg (2006:139) says he has analysed more than two hundred of 
third wave elections in Africa which have shown that uninterrupted series of 
competitive elections imbue society with certain democratic qualities. Repeated 
elections regardless of their relative freeness or fairness appear to have positive 
impact on human freedom and democratic values.  
 
This study is interested in finding out the problems surrounding the attainment of 
democracy in Africa, using the cases of Kenya and Zimbabwe. It seeks to 
understand the obstacles and challenges to the democratization processes in the 
two countries by focusing on the 2007/2008 contested elections as well as 
previous elections, and the attempts by external actors to deal with the results of 
the elections. 
 
1.2 Aims of the Study  
 
In terms of democracy the research report wishes to address two issues around 
democratization: 1) why  democracy has been hard to attain 2) what are the 
obstacles to building democracy in the respective countries. 
 
Civilians have been marginalized at one point or the other in the democratization 
process as well as the electoral process. The research report will interrogate 
issues around effective political participation of the citizens, which is also linked 
to democracy. There is a connection between civil participation and the cause of 
electoral violence, the latter happens due to a lot of factors but mostly, enraged 
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citizens. The research report will find out what the role of the citizens of Kenya 
and Zimbabwe was in this regard. 
 
Electoral violence shows a weakness in the respective countries’ value for 
democracy and the decline in democratic functions. The research report aims to 
find out firstly reasons behind electoral violence and secondly what the role of 
external actors such as the African Union were in Kenya and Zimbabwe. 
 
In dissecting the electoral violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe, the research report 
aims to assess the significance of elections in aiding democracy. 
 
1.3  Research Questions 
 
 What are the obstacles to building democracy in Zimbabwe and Kenya? 
 What are the reasons that led to electoral violence in recent elections? 
 What role have external actors played in helping in the return to stability and 
democracy? 
 
1.4 Rationale of the Study 
It is significant to embark on this study because the notion of democracy has 
been practiced partially due to highly contentious political environments. Africa is 
reputable for dictatorship and authoritarian governments which have meant a 
silenced and dormant civil society. This brings to question the legitimacy of 
“democracy” in Africa. Through civil engagement, mobilization and action against 
corrupt and unjust governments, citizens can bring about change and achieve 
justice. Examples of this are the revolt in South Africa against the apartheid 
government.  As well as the revolt in the Niger Delta against the marginalization 
of the inhabitants of the delta. 
 
Zimbabwe and Kenya have recently held elections in which the citizens from both 
countries where displeased by the electoral outcomes. In both countries the 
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ruling parties were accused of rigging the votes and heavily influencing the 
respective electoral commissions. This study comes at a time when Africa seems 
to be incapable of having free and fair elections, elections that are peaceful and 
accepted by all. According to Adejumobi (2000:59) Africa remains incapable of 
free and fair elections due to the predominance of political dictatorships and 
personalized rule. Zimbabwe has been ruled by President Robert Mugabe for 
over two decades. He has managed to win the support of the masses and at 
times his party has been accused of rigging elections. 29 March 2008, saw 
Zimbabwe and its citizens standing on their toes, many had hoped that this would 
be the end of his reign but he was declared the president. This then enraged a 
disillusioned citizenry and sparked electoral violence between ZANU PF 
(Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front) and the opposition party the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The role of the citizens in the electoral 
process is one that was ignored, the people seem to have chosen the MDC with 
46% of the electoral vote but the ZEC (Zimbabwe Economic Commission) 
declared ZANU PF the winning party which only had 44 % of the votes. The 
second round of voting held on June 27 2008 saw ZANU PF win the electoral 
votes with over 80%. According to Moore and Bond (2005) even in past elections 
polling agents were asked to sign affidavits swearing secrecy to station 
procedures and boycotted by the opposition. 
 
 
Kenya’s plight was no different, filled with electoral violence and vote rigging. 
Elections held on the 27 December 2007 exposed this further, with the opposition 
party the Orange Democracy Movement (ODM) also battling against the ruling 
party the Party of National Unity (PNU). Although the situation in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe were somewhat similar, Kenya faced ethnic tensions. According to the 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights(2008:8), the 
Electoral Commission of Kenya released results from half of Kenya’s 210 
constituencies, putting Raila Odinga at 2,755,111 votes and Mwai Kibaki  at 
2,172,440 in the presidential contest. The report further states that suspicion of 
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electoral fraud grew by the hour as presidential vote tallying appeared to be 
increasingly delayed. Such situations occurred frequently in both countries thus 
both show the extent of flaws in the electoral process. 
 
The election process in Zimbabwe and Kenya has not gone well at all, there have 
been countless times when elections have failed. In Zimbabwe the parliamentary 
elections in 2000 and later elections in March 2002 have all been threatened by 
violence and alledged government interference in the electoral process Randall 
and Svasand (2002:30). Unlike Zimbabwe, Kenya managed from the 1992-1997 
elections to have somewhat fair elections but as late as 2007 had a similar 
backdrop of violence and vote rigging. This study aims to highlight all these 
electoral flaws and assess the scope of democracy that exists in Africa. Lindberg 
(2006:139) has analyzed more than two hundred third wave elections in Africa 
and it shows that an uninterrupted series of competitive elections imbues society 
with certain democratic qualities. Repeated elections regardless of their relative 
freeness or fairness appear to have positive impact on human freedom and 
democratic values. This shows that elections are significant to democracy. More 
importantly this research report addresses the importance of elections because 
they are still a viable means of ensuring the orderly process of leadership 
succession and change; they are an instrument of political authority and 
legitimation (Adejumobi 2000:59). He further says the reason elections in Africa 
have failed or are absent largely defines the predominance of political 
dictatorships in Africa. It is important to note that it is through elections that 
citizens have a chance to voice out their concerns and opinion.  Similarly 
Adejumobi (2000:60) says democracy only means that the people have the 
opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who want to rule them. Elections 
symbolize popular sovereignty and the expression of the social pact between 
state and the people. 
 
Both countries have experienced electoral violence and it is important to 
interrogate the role of external actors in maintaining democracy. Third party 
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intervention has become one of the norms in solving issues in the international 
political arena. Leaders can also allow mediators to have a role because of 
certain opportunities. According to Carment and James (2000:175) political 
leaders respond to international opportunities to promote their domestic interests 
and most implicitly the security and power of the ruling party elite. They further 
say rulers will use violence if it can secure or increase their share of power. 
These International opportunities allow external actors to have an inside view of 
the issues. Moghalu (2008:34) says the response of mediators and protagonists 
in these crises are present to negotiate power sharing deals, coalition 
governments in which previous governments and the opposition govern jointly. 
These arguments are valid and they show that there are different reasons why 
countries allow external negotiators into their political space. 
 
 
There are many reasons why elections and democracy in general have not been 
able to work in Africa, Makinda (1996:558) cites four reasons; firstly he says 
democracy was denied to Africans for about a century, any opposition to 
European rule was crushed. The second is that the continent has always been at 
the periphery of world politics and thirdly Africa’s lack of economic, scientific and 
technological infrastructure and lastly the cultural dimension of poverty, 
underdevelopment, injustice and authoritarianism. Africa has been plagued by 
various malaises; the slate was never clean in order to start afresh. Adejumobi 
(2000:62) says a demeaning politics of de-participation and the shrinking of the 
electoral arena which characterized the post-colonial era in Africa had its roots in 
earlier colonial history. The natures of elections in post colonial era in Africa 
therefore tilted towards a state regulated and non competitive model. At different 
points of the spectrum leaders in Kenya and Zimbabwe fatefully decided against 
the multiparty systems and vetoed for authoritarian regimes.  
 
Many countries as a result were forced to change their restrictive and rigid 
regimes. Elections in most cases are an expedient political exercise for ruling 
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regimes partly because of their economic implications in terms of external aid 
flows and economic assistance and partly because of their public relations 
advantage in propping up the political profile of the regime in the international 
arena (Adejumobi 2000:66). According to Makinda (1996:555) authoritarian 
leaders increasingly came under pressure between 1990 and 1993 to liberalize 
and permit participation in the political process.  It seems most countries were 
persuaded to change due to perceived incentives of being democratic. Some 
would say that Africa turned democratic to gain economic favour from the West. 
 
Competitive party systems and elections are an important aspect of democracy 
Lindberg (2006:148) says the element of competition is inherent in elections, it 
provides voters and organisations with a means to pressure incumbents and 
demand concessions from politicians. It is important at all times that politicians 
within their political parties are kept accountable for their decisions and keep 
legitimate democracies. Kenya and Zimbabwe have solid background of being 
either de facto or de jure single party systems. Kenya was once a one party state 
before 1991 and Zimbabwe is still being ruled by one party and could be 
considered a de facto one party state. In Africa plural systems have been hard to 
maintain effectively at some point or another. According to Randall and Svasand 
(2002:32) African political parties are plagued by weak organisations, low levels 
of institutionalisation and weak links to the society that they are meant to 
represent. This will be discussed more in detail in the research report, as well as 
providing an historical outline about opposition parties in the respective countries 
yet it is important to know the significance of political parties. 
 
According to Bogaards (2000:171) the opposition performs a crucial function in a 
democratic polity. Constitutional political opposition is the sine qua non of 
contemporary democracy. Mass politics and its institutionalisation in some form 
or another are required before a regime can be called democratic. Bogaards 
reiterates the sentiment that opposition is important and is an end result of a 
thriving democracy. Similarly Randall and Svasand (2002:33) state that parties 
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assemble and promote policy platforms for voters to choose from. In the new 
African democracies the overwhelming judgement seems to be that parties care 
little about presenting clearly distinguishable policy platforms. The general 
assessment of election campaigns is that they are dominated by personality 
issues and claims and counter claims to the merits of the individual candidates. 
Clearly there are many aspects of maintaining democracy but the most relevant 
to this research report is the electoral process and elections. 
 
 The above shows the interconnectedness of competitive party systems and 
elections which one does not deny. The study itself looks at elections specifically 
to assess the impact of democratic reform in Africa and how democracy is 
perceived. It is important to document electoral violence in the electoral process, 
most countries throughout Africa prepare for this eventuality due to party 
intolerance, disgruntled civilians and other factors. The issue of democracy is 
ever pressing; Africa itself waits for a time when all ethnic groups will live in 
peace, civilians have control over their governments, governments and civilians 
interacting to keep democracy alive. Thus the research report uses Zimbabwe 
and Kenya as case studies in investigating the difficulties of attaining and 
maintaining democracy. The research report will suggest that citizens can aid in 
maintaining democracy forward. 
 
1.5 Theoretical framework 
There is no one theory that explains why Africa is the way it, it would be ideal 
considering the confusion that rests among scholars. There is no one box we can 
fit the problems into. Therefore the research report will show two theories that 
each carry some importance in bringing clarity to the issue at hand. The two 
theories which will we discussed are Patrimonialism or Neo-patrimonialism and 
new democratic theory otherwise known as Participatory democracy theory. The 
reason for Patrimonialism is to show that there has been a system of patronage 
and client relationship that African politics have always operated. The reason for 
the use of the New democratic Theory is to show that the decision making 
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process can also be undertaken through partnership with the citizenry which is 
the ideal situation. These two theories show us where Africa and its state come 
from and where it should be ideally experiencing a new kind of democracy. 
 
Scholars who study the theory of patrimonialism do not agree on the definition. 
According to Theobald (1982:548) patrimonialism has been linked with or treated 
as synonymous with patron-client relations. She further says there are two types 
of patrimonialism: one is found in those increasingly few regimes where 
legitimacy is still based upon traditional grounds and the second type is personal 
rulership which does not require any belief in the ruler’s personal qualifications 
but is based mainly on material incentives and rewards. Pitcher et al (2009:126) 
disagrees with the above view of patrimonialism, they say patrimonialism was not 
a synonym for corruption or bad governance, violence or tribalism or weak state. 
It was instead a specific form of authority and a source of legitimacy. Pitcher et al 
(2009:137) further state that many scholars have begun to recognize the 
limitations of the concept for explaining transition to democracy and variations in 
politics and policy among democratic regimes. This has resulted in more 
judicious uses of the term and greater recognition of the possible coexistence of 
neopatrimonialism with formal democratic procedures as well as the 
interpenetration of the two.  This shows that the theory needs to be further 
dissected in future, allowing opposing scholars to see what definitions and 
explanations of the concept are plausible. 
 
Africa is not immune from the global challenge to authoritarianism. Between 1990 
and 1993 more than half of Africa’s fifty two governments responded to domestic 
and international pressures by holding competitive presidential or legislative 
elections. The dynamics and outcomes of these transitions vary from country to 
country. Meaning that in some cases, countries could afford to change the 
political system. In some cases, a competitive election has led to an alternation of 
political leaders and the emergence of a fragile democratic regime; more often 
the transition has been flawed with the incumbent stealing the election and 
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blocked by the deadlock between the incumbent and the opposition over rules of 
the political system, at times marred by widespread civil unrest Bratton and van 
de Walle (1994:453). This is the situation the research report is trying to explain 
through the use of patrimonialism. Many countries still find it hard to give up the 
power and security they have, hence so much strife has followed. Bratton and 
Van de Walle (1994: 459) say some of the new states are not states at all they 
are virtually the private instruments of those powerful enough to rule. 
Neopatrimonialism is the most salient type of authority in the developing world 
because it corresponds to the normal forms of social organization in pre-colonial 
societies. 
 
According to Theobald (1982:550) patrimonialism plays a major intergrative role 
in the new states where the political center tends to be organized around the 
division of “spoils” in the form of jobs, economic aid, loans and legal spoils. 
Typically these spoils are apportioned to the leaders of various groups or factions 
who then transmit to their followers such resources as are necessary to retain 
their support. Pitcher et al (2009:131) says African communities were historically 
organized along patron-client relationships a pattern they now perceive in the 
contemporary political organization of states. While other states have moved on 
to newer and more efficient forms of governance, Africa remains in a community 
centered orientation. What has kept African states from moving on is often left 
unspecified, a common line of argument is that colonialism while disrupting 
traditional patterns of authority in some instances also reconstructed and 
reconfigured patron-clientism so that it survived in traditional form or another.  
The above argument is yet to be disputed; it has become the norm and reason to 
why Africa is the way it is.   
 
 
According to Bratton and van de Walle (1994:466) in neo patrimonial regimes 
political transitions are struggles to establish legal rules, struggles over the rules 
of the political game. Political transitions determine the future constellation of 
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winners and losers in the socio economic realm. These are problems that a 
patrimonial regime brings and that constantly face regimes that are patrimonial in 
nature.  An ideally democratic society also brings with it many issues, loosers as 
well as winners but democracy is currently the most preferred ideology. The next 
part of the section discusses the new democratic theory. 
 
 The reason why the new democratic theory was chosen is because it recognizes 
the importance of civil participation in democracy as well as the importance of the 
electoral process. According to Killian (2008:2) the new democratic theory offers 
a critique of both traditional or classical democracy theory and modern 
democratic theory. At the core of the critique is the weakness of liberal 
democracy, representative democracy, elitist democracy, pluralist democracy 
and others in enhancing full participation of the people in decision making in the 
state and other spheres. Killian continues by saying that according to traditional 
or classical theory the people are given a negative role, that is, people are 
involved in little more than passively choosing between options presented to 
them. This idea is associated with the notion that the elected representatives 
have greater knowledge and wisdom than their constituents. 
 
Megill (1970:65) puts the ultimate picture in mind; he says democracy today as 
always means rule by the people that is a social order which is controlled by 
those who live and work in the society. Even the institutionalists agree with the 
above statement. According to Breytenbach (1996:15) without participation there 
is no democracy. The vote alone cannot be an indicator of democracy. He further 
says the preferable route would be to create institutions for public participation 
first. 
 
According to Deth (2001:3) democracy is not worth its name if it does not refer to 
government by the people. When it comes to participation formal procedures like 
voting ,working for parties or candidates, attending election rallies, attending 
community meetings ,joining with others to raise issues or contacting elected 
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leaders can have an educative effect on increasing interest and efficacy as well 
as building support for democracy, this according to the institutionalists( Chu, 
Chang and Huang 2004). This points out the importance of the involvement of 
citizens in maintaining democracy and partaking in certain aspects that keep 
democracy alive. 
 
The new democratic theory is not a static theory it is constantly being build upon, 
according to Warren (1992:8), Democratic theories argue for expanding the 
scope and domain of democracy and assume that democratic experiences will 
transform individuals in democratic ways. He further states that there are three 
ways this can be achieved; firstly increased democracy transforms individualistic 
and conflicting interests into common and non conflicting ones, in the process 
developing capacities of citizenship that reduce factional threats to rights and 
pluralism. This suggests how electoral violence could have been prevented in 
Kenya and Zimbabwe; both countries have identified the need to transforms 
individualistic and conflicting interests into common and non conflicting ones. 
This is necessary for peace and democracy in both countries. 
 
Secondly, the transformation needed reduces conflict. They allow the reduced 
use of power as a medium of political interaction. This increases consensus and 
governability. Thirdly democracy is then necessary for the values of self 
development, autonomy and self-governance; these are the values and freedoms 
presumably which ought to be protected. The above suggested transformations 
are realistic enough although there is still the issue of how democracy is not 
easily attainable. There are positives to the democratic theory; it balances 
democratic participation both from institutions, government and civilians. For the 
researcher it sums up how democracy ought to be handled. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
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The proposed study is largely qualitative. Journals, articles and books have been 
utilized to help unpack the differences and similarities of Zimbabwe and Kenya’s 
democratization processes. These journals, articles and books have helped in 
understanding the importance of the role of civilians in the electoral process. 
These secondary sources have been used to interrogate the reasons behind the 
electoral violence in both countries. Primary and secondary sources have been 
used throughout this study. Secondary sources include the bulk of the literature 
i.e. books, journal articles and newspaper articles. Primary sources include 
official documents from governments, organizations and transcripts from 
interviews. 
 
The research topic requires extensive literature to be used in addressing the 
research questions. The bulk of the literature will include journals and newspaper 
articles.  
 
The Wits libraries have been of great assistance in the information gathering 
process. The libraries hold extensive access to valuable information. 
Warteinweiler and Cullen Libraries have some literature on the electoral issues 
facing Zimbabwe and Kenya. Another benefit is that electronically through the 
library system one has been able to access electronic databases such as 
JSTOR, EBSCO Host, Sciencedirect; these databases contain vital 
contemporary information. 
 
A lot of online based news sites have been utilized such as the Mail and 
Guardian Online, BBC News, CNN. These have been used in order to 
give the study a connection to what is currently going on in these respective 
countries. Online based information has been vital for this study as most issues 
discussed are contemporary in their nature. 
 
SAIIA (South African Institute of International Affairs) has been of great 
assistance. It is a research tank that will aid the knowledge of democracy in 
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Africa. They do have researchers who focus on democracy issues in Africa. 
Zimbabwe has been a subject of discourse in many of their papers. 
 
The Afro barometer website has aided this study. Their focus is largely Africa and 
they have written intensely on some areas of the study 
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Chapter 2 
 
2. Overview of democracy in Africa and Challenges in Kenya and Zimbabwe 
 
“A country does not have to be deemed fit for 
democracy rather it has to become fit through 
democracy” Amartya Sen 1999 
 
 
 Many African countries have undergone difficulties trying to instill democracy in 
their respective countries. The process of democratisation has not been without 
challenges and many of these challenges have not subsided. Many arguments 
have been based around the colonial history that Africa has which has then 
translated into problems within government. The discussion becomes challenging 
when trying to find out what the real challenges of democracy are in Africa. 
According to Chabal (1998:295) confusion towards democratization is more than 
definitional, it is analytical and ideological. The heart of the debate is about the 
nature of power in Africa and possible political trajectories of African countries in 
years to come. Sadly one realizes that in most cases the power lies not in the 
people but in the elites in power hence the nature of power is essentially skewed 
and might take many more decades to fix. 
 
 This chapter will briefly look at the challenges of democratization in Africa, 
democracy as a concept that is flawed and is not without debate. The second 
aspect that the chapter will briefly look at is the post colonial state in Africa as 
defined through the democratic transitions in Kenya and Zimbabwe. The third 
and main section will discuss the differences and similarities of democracy in 
Kenya and Zimbabwe, looking at how democracy has been carried out in both 
countries and the challenges thereof. 
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2.1Democracy in Africa: challenges and obstacles 
 
Democracy is not an easy ideology to enact even for those who claim its part of 
their history. Africa can only hope that one day a suitable system arises even 
though it might not originate from the continent. For a long time everyone 
envisioned democracy to be the light that brightens the ‘dark continent’ but with 
each democratic wave Africa fails to fully democratize, in many instances the 
ideology remains a theory lacking to be practiced.  The problem may not lie with 
democracy itself. There are mixed perceptions about what democracy is 
supposed to be and the context which it ought to be practiced. 
 
According to Fayemi (2009:103-104) democracy is a system that entails a 
system of government that allows citizens freedom or choice. He says 
democracy neither sets conditions for its outcomes nor characterizes itself as 
anything other than an electoral system. Essentially the value of democracy is 
the peaceful transfer of power enacted through regular elections. As mentioned 
before Chabal (1998:295) says that confusion towards democratization is more 
than definitional, it is analytical and ideological. The heart of the debate he says 
is about the nature of power in Africa and possible trajectories of Africa in years 
to come.  There are many views about ‘democracy’ and what it ought to be, again 
just as there is a theoretical problem there is a practical problem as well. 
According to Clapham (1993:425)  democracy even in the form of multiparty and 
federal systems, written constitutions, bill of rights, houses of parliament and their 
related trappings was all too obviously a once off response to a particular set of 
political circumstances in which the colonial rulers were abandoning power and a 
new set of nationalistic politicians was inheriting it. For colonialists it was a 
convenient mechanism for getting out, dignified with the transfer of power. 
 
Although what Clapham alludes to may be true, to many African and other 
developing countries, democracy was a way for the ordinary man to gain a voice 
a chance for prosperity and for development to be experienced.  Chabal says 
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(1998:301) democracy is seen as a prerequisite to development and 
development is taken to be the only way out of the present crisis. 
 
 
Although many may recommend democracy, many can also see that it comes 
with its own set of disadvantages.Fayemi (2009:106) states that democracy as a 
concept is not cast in iron. Consequently in practice it cannot be a perfect 
system. He says it may not be a guarantee for economic development but 
democracy holds more potential for enhancing and promoting human 
development than any other system of government. He (2009:108) further says 
the fact that a democracy is old does not mean it is likely to be stable. Long 
established democracies face their own unique challenges, for example they face 
a growing trend of apathy and disillusionment among voters particularly the 
young whereas in emerging democracies voter turnout tends to be high. 
According to Sen (1999:6) democracy is a demanding system and not just a 
mechanical condition (like majority rule) taken in isolation.  
 
One could say that the moment the politicians and policy makers start seeing that 
for democracy to work anywhere in the world there needs to be strong citizens 
who are able to act on the same  level that the politicians do. Some may say that 
this is ideal but most revolutions and ideologies begin with a group of voice either 
for or against that ideology the same should apply to democracy. Democracy 
may have some negative connotations but it is mostly perceived to be good for a 
country. 
 
According to Sen (1999:6-7) there are three ways in which democracy enriches 
the lives of citizens. Firstly he says political freedom is a part of human freedom 
in general and exercising civil and political rights is a crucial part of the good lives 
of individuals as social beings. Secondly he says democracy has an important 
instrumental value in enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing and 
supporting their claims to political attention. Lastly the practice of democracy 
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gives citizens an opportunity to learn from one another and helps society to form 
its values and priorities. Similarly Fayemi (2009:105) says democracy 
emphasizes that values should not be forced upon people and stipulates liberty, 
the separation of power, majority rule and the sovereignty of the people. It gives 
primacy to political and moral values of equality, reciprocity and respect for the 
views of others. The role of the citizen in maintaining and promoting democracy 
is more valid than being a mere constituency in an electoral system, without the 
citizen democracy as imagined in ancient Greece fails to exist. 
 
According to McFaul (2005:2) there are ten points that make democracy 
advantageous: 
1. Democracy helps to prevent rule by cruel and vicious autocrats; 
2. Democracy guarantees its citizens a number of fundamental rights that 
non-democratic systems do not and cannot grant; 
3.  Democracy insures its citizens a broader range of personal freedom than 
any feasible alternative to it; 
4. Democracy helps people protect their own fundamental interests; 
5. Only a democratic government can provide maximum opportunity for a 
person to exercise the freedom of self-determination, that ism to live under 
laws of their own choosing; 
6. Only  a democratic government can provide a maximum opportunity for 
exercising  moral responsibility; 
7. Democracy fosters human development more fully than any feasible 
alternative;  
8. Only  a democratic government can foster a relatively high degree of 
political equality; 
9. Modern representative democracies do not fight one another; 
10. Countries with democratic governments tend to be more prosperous than 
countries with non democratic governments. 
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It is important to note that a country at some point or another may not have all 
these qualities and revert into being a non democratic state. This largely depends 
on the kind of leadership that a country has, many democratic leaders choose to 
have a term or two but many leaders want to live out their entire lives in the 
presidency which highlights their non democratic nature. This brings us to 
discussion of the challenges that face Africa as a whole and many times it is due 
to governance and leadership that democracy is not fully experienced.  
 
 
According to Clapham (1993:423) the democratization process reflects a crisis in 
the African state itself which is becoming clear. Democracy has destabilized most 
states instead of being useful. He says the major obstacles to democracy in 
Africa lie as they have always in the absence or inadequacy of the social, political 
and economic conditions. These conditions foster a sense of identity needed to 
make accountability possible and thus to institutionalize democratic methods 
such as a regular and respectful way of organizing political life.  This statement 
reflects on the rhetoric that the African state as known is an imported idea that 
has caused many challenges. Clapham says one of the obstacles to such a 
sense of identity has been the grotesque artificiality of the state itself. Similarly 
according to Khagram (1993:55) Africa Is still not ready for democracy and the 
most that can be expected from these current processes of democratization are 
softer forms of authoritarian rule. He says the democratic transitions that took 
place in numerous countries will most likely leave extant social and economic 
inequalities intact but can be quite genuine nonetheless. This then brings us to 
the issue of the post colonial state. 
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2.2 Post –colonial state in Africa: towards democratic transitions 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s it  was African nationalism, social 
change,decolonization,political instability  and economic development; in the 
1970s, it was military and one party rule and economic prosperity; in the 1980s, 
re introduced to civilisation and transitions to democracy, economic recession, 
structural adjustment, internal war and the virtual atrophy of some states in the 
empirical sense, governance and foreign debt and in the 1990s,increased 
marginalization of Africa in the global system, collapse of national economies, 
escalation of internal war and civil strife and democratic transition (Osaghae 
1995:186). This is a picture that explains Africa’s political economy of transitions 
over a couple of decades. Democratic transitions remain a poignant mark of the 
continents’ history. 
 
This part of the chapter will discuss the post colonial state in Africa particularly 
the transitions towards democracy that took place in the 1990s. Much of what 
has not happened has been because of the imported nature of the state in Africa 
hence its continuing struggle towards democracy. According to Khagram 
(1993:60) transition, the initial phase of democratization has been designated as 
the “interval between one political regime and another”. Transitions he says are 
“delimited”, by this he means on the one side it is the launching of the process of 
dissolution of an authoritarian regime and on the other by the installation of some 
form of democracy. It could also be the return to some form of authoritarian rule 
or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative. It is also possible that transitions 
may produce a hybrid regime or be completely inconclusive and descend into 
anarchy. As stated before a transition can be defined as an unknown interval and 
can transform into any kind of regime. Khagram says this is due to its delimited 
nature of transitions. These transitions are flexible and might not be democratic. 
This is why he further states (1995:63) that due to the extreme uncertainty of 
transitions, they loose the structural conditions that normally constrain political 
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behaviour.  One could say that these structural conditions allow for a clear sense 
of direction towards democracy or any other political systems. 
 
From the above one can say that transitions are rather short-term unless the 
effect that they produce is long lasting. Then the ideology such as democracy 
can remain constant and gradually become advanced. According to Kaufman 
and Haggard (1997:263) the approach to the political economy of democratic 
transitions stresses the effect of short term economic conditions on the 
bargaining power and interests of incumbents and opposition. They further state 
(1997:264) that democratization is the crafting of alliances in the transition 
process. 
 
 Osaghae (1995:187) states that problems of frameworks for analyzing 
democratic transitions in Africa begin with the definition of the concept of 
transition itself. It is defined as the interval between one regime and another; 
more specifically, it is the process of change from an authoritarian regime to a 
democratic regime. It involves erosion of the past and construction of the future. 
The concept of transitions as an interval is not well suited to the study of political 
transitions. He further (1995:188) says the prevalent assumption that transitions 
to democracy are a new experience is conveyed by notions of democratization as 
a learning process. This has to be replaced by one that sees it in incrementalist 
terms as a continuation of previous efforts. The learning of democracy is indeed 
an old process which began in most countries with the transition from colonial 
rule. In addition Kaufman and Haggard (1997:265) say it is now impossible to 
formulate a theory of democratic transitions that does not explicitly address the 
strategic interactions between and within government and the opposition. This is 
why the significance of the opposition will be discussed in the next chapter. It is 
also important to re-emphasize from the above that the interval between one 
regime and another does not mean a transition towards democracy. 
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One could say that another problem that made transitions problematic in Africa 
was the issue of the contested nature of democracy. Many African scholars still 
claim that it is not suited to the African context. This means that it might still be 
perceived as an external ideology. According to Osaghae (1995:187) current 
democratization is a Western project and there is a need to properly situate its 
construction. He says the West must be careful to assist the organic 
development in each country. 
The underlying factor comes from democracy itself being an imported ideology. 
Africa is not accustomed to this western ideal. According to Fayemi (2009:102):   
 
“The forces that led to democratization were both internal and external. Internally, it was 
occasioned by the development failures of many African states in the 1980s and in 
particular the mixed and meager accomplishments under structural adjustment 
programs. This demand for improved governance led to the rise of pro-democracy 
movements in African states, which resulted in concerted popular agitation for change. 
On the external front, there were serious concerns from international agencies and 
donor nations on the autocratic regimes in many African states. The pressure from the 
international scene for universal human freedom and life with dignity coupled with 
promises of improved bilateral relations for non-dictatorial states stimulated the internal 
drive for democratization in Africa. “ 
 
 
Similarly Chabal (1998:291) argues whether political liberalization was driven by 
internal political dynamics or the outcome of external faction. He says  those who 
stressed the primacy of internal factors highlights five factors; erosion in the 
legitimacy of the one-party state, the decline in all aspects of state capacity, the 
failure of development, the depth of the economic crisis,and lastly the strength of 
political protest or pre-democracy movements. In contrast Chabal (1998:293) 
says those who emphasize the external factors look at three aspects; a more 
conservative outlook on North South relations, secondly the widespread 
imposition of structural adjustment programmes and lastly the collapse of 
communism and the end of the cold war. 
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The internal drive shows that there was a need for democracy, perhaps the 
people wanted a change, this shows that citizens have long been active politically 
but along the way they were silenced. One could say that the external drive was 
more pressure-filled and could have led more to democracy than the internal 
drive which is still questionable. Furthermore Fayemi (2009:114) quotes Wambia 
dia Wamba who says democracy in the form of the Western multiparty system is 
unsuitable for the African situation; he says one cannot democratize Africa by 
imposing the western democratic system on the African situation from the top. 
Similarly Bujra (2005: 12) says it is not possible to transfer political institutions 
across nations which have different historical experiences and different 
civilizations and cultures. He further says democracy often is not fully practiced 
by those countries claiming impeccable democratic credentials.   
 
Democratic transitions also highlight different actors in the process, with reasons 
ranging from change from autocratic regimes and economic issues .According to 
Haggard and Kaufman (1997:265) the first actors in the transition process are 
political elites whether in the government or in opposition not interest groups, 
mass organizations, social movements, or classes. The second group of actors 
are typically defined in terms of their orientation towards regime change 
hardliners, softliners, moderates or extremists rather than by interests rooted in 
economic structures and conditions or institutional roles. The third group behave 
strategically their actions are influenced by expectations concerning the 
behaviour of allies and rivals. Finally democratization is the outcome of explicit or 
implicit negotiations; new institutions are bargains among self-interested 
politicians. For so long the deciding power belonged to the elites. Actors need to 
include social movements, citizens and different classes of people. Because of 
this it can be argued that earlier transitions were not appropriate because they 
failed to truly entrench democratic systems but they have important lessons 
which need to be factored into current transitions. The lessons from the past is 
that successful transitions or democratic consolidation does not simply mean the 
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defeat of undemocratic rulers like Kamuzu Banda or Kenneth Kaunda  but the 
putting in place of democratic institutions  notably multi party  systems, bill of 
rights and free and fair elections (Osaghae 1995:187). 
 
 Full transitions at any particular point in both Kenya and Zimbabwe were difficult 
to achieve due to various actors and issues involved.  According to Chabal 
(1998:289) Kenya exemplifies a process of blocked political reform in which the 
determination of the president to hold on to power and the division of the political 
opposition has combined to prevent a change of regime. The experience of 
Kenya seems to indicate that where a regime wants to prevent democratic 
change it can find means to do so. One could say the same when observing 
Zimbabwe, since independence there has only been an autocratic regime which 
has supposedly undergone the transition from being authoritarian to democratic 
in nature. The problem with Zimbabwe’s democratic transition is the fact that it 
has been a one party state and consequently the same incumbent president. The 
transition has been one dimensional in terms of leadership. According to Peter 
(2003:2) ZANU-PF standing for re-election many times raises the central problem 
in the probable transition which is accountability. One could say there is a need 
to be accountable towards change. This also means that the constituency is not 
holding the party accountable through elections. 
 
Briefly looking at the state after independence, it was inherited intact and in the 
view of many people the present Kenyan state and most African states are 
simply an expanded form of the colonial state which were inherited in 1963, 
institutions, laws, culture and since then the independent state did not reform 
what it inherited in order to bring about social transformation Bujra (2005:16). As 
stated before Clapham (1993:425) says democracy for colonialists was a 
convenient mechanism for getting out dignified manner and the transfer of power. 
According to Bujra (2005:21) the faction of the political elite which took over 
power in Kenya from the colonialist , failed to initiate policies which would 
eventually lead to the fulfillment of the nationalist goals for wanting independence 
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namely nation building ,eradication of disease, ignorance and poverty. Much of 
the same could be said about Zimbabwe, the freedom fighters enjoyed so much 
power and wealth and forgot to equally distribute. 
 
 
This shows that Africa as whole experienced difficulties in taking up the 
democracy cause, there were so many factors which still inhibit democracy. 
Although some scholars still allude to the idea that the transition to democracy is 
a Western notion, one could say not much effort has been put into making sure 
that the system succeeds because of varying reasons such as corruption and 
patronage politics that still rule the continent. This has been described as 
personalized rule which still exists. A country needs to be fit through democracy.  
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2.3 Kenya and Zimbabwe: Democracy and its challenges 
 
 It has been noted in the above sections that democratic transitions do not churn 
out the same result from one administration to the next. When it comes to Kenya 
and Zimbabwe democratization has been hard to achieve and in both countries 
has not been presented on a full scale. Concepts such as democracy or even 
democratic transitions have to be carefully used.  
 
In the 1960s and1970s Kenya was often portrayed as one of the few successful 
democracies in Africa; this image was reinforced by the occurrences of regular 
elections, the peaceful transfer of power from President Jomo Kenyatta to Daniel 
Arap Moi in 1978 and the absence of military coups  so rampant elsewhere in 
Africa. Kenya was often said to be the best that Africa could hope for (Maina 
1992:122). Similarly after independence in 1980 Zimbabwe was said to follow in 
Kenya’s footsteps, it had a flourishing economy and was said to be the bread 
basket of Southern Africa. Its success superseded that of Kenya. 
 
 Achieving independence was great for both these countries however striving for 
democracy was very difficult. From the 1980s Kenya faced a downward spiral; in 
1988 queuing in front of candidates replaced the secret ballot in parliamentary 
elections in spite of popular protest. This arrangement intimidated many votes 
and reduced a once vibrant parliament to a “rubber stamp parliament” after the 
1988 elections. Many intellectuals were forced into exile where they advocated 
for human rights in Kenya (Maina 1992:123). Similarly around the 1990s the 
hope of a democratic Zimbabwe was dashed. Instead of expanding the economy 
had begun to contract, from being the bread basket the country had become a 
basket case. Instead of providing an anchor of stability in the Southern region, 
Zimbabwe was now a potential source of both political and economic turmoil 
thereby undercutting the region’s efforts to lure investment for growth. 
(Sachikonye 2002:18) 
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This shows a lack of being able to sustain a transition into democracy. The crisis 
in both countries has continued, this not only an issue of multiparty elections and 
elections in general. According to Fayemi (2009:104) democracy emphasizes 
that values should not be forced upon people and stipulates liberty, the 
separation of power, majority rule, and the sovereignty of the people. Democracy 
gives primacy to political and normal values of equality, reciprocity and respect 
for the views of others. All the above have been unattainable in both countries. 
People in Zimbabwe are still forced to entertain the efforts of a one party state 
which maybe a value that is forced upon its citizens. In both governments the 
separation of power has been a difficult to maintain as well respecting the view of 
others. 
 
 
Zimbabwe and Kenya have similar difficulties when it comes to their respective 
democratization process. It is difficult to trace how exactly democracy has been 
achieved due to the fact that there are no criteria in achieving democracy. What 
has been known and shown is how a country looses democracy that is through 
human rights violations, lack of competitive elections, lack of free and fair 
elections and largely a repressed citizenry. However on the other hand these 
countries have some similarities. Firstly leadership is a constant challenge and 
seems to have no sense of direction, leaders want wealthy and healthy countries 
but most of the wealth lies in their own personal coffers. The highly personalized 
rule still exists to this. A point of difference exists in the nature of politics. In 
Kenya the political issues are largely filled with ethnic issues and in Zimbabwe 
one party and its leader continue to somehow intimidate the people into electing 
the his very own party.  
 
 
Both countries face a weak opposition, Kenya introduced opposition politics in 
1991 but recently has had to enter into a coalition government. Zimbabwe has 
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with the least effort allowed opposition parties to canvass freely; it has also 
recently signed a coalition deal. Civil society is both active in both countries and 
that factor has helped keep democracy as well as human rights issues intact, 
although that has at some point become a contentious area. Revolt has also 
been the nature of politics. In both countries there has been unsatisfied majority 
of the constituency and this has aided ongoing tensions among citizens due to 
party rivalry and politics. Kenya’s politics has been filled with ethnic as well as 
political tensions. Although Kenya has various official languages the Luo and 
Kikuyu are at the centre of the issues. 
 
 
 
There are three factors that could have prevented proper transition and progress.  
Firstly both countries have experienced internal war at some point or another and 
these could have hindered democracy. This has not been well documented. 
According to Bermeo (2003:162) most of the theoretical literature on democratic 
consolidation leaves the connection to war either wholly neglected or seriously 
undertheorised. Africa has been a place of conflict and war for many decades 
and perhaps that has been an aspect that is indirectly  linked to why some 
countries have not had smooth democratic transitions and have not been able to 
protect democracy fully on all levels. This is not to say that democracy can ever 
be fully achieved by all states perfectly but it is worth reaching a satisfactory level 
for all concerned. 
 
 Secondly both countries being a part of Africa have been subjected to the 
pessimistic view that Africa was not meant for democracy. (Joseph1997: 363) 
democratization was not supposed to happen in Africa. It had little of what 
seemed necessary for constitutional democratic politics. African countries were 
too poor, to culturally fragmented and insufficiently capitalist; they were not fully 
penetrated by Western Christianity and lacked the requisite civic culture. This has 
been echoed throughout literature by many scholars. However this has not 
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necessarily been the typical case, most African countries such as Botswana and 
South Africa continue to prove this statement wrong. As much as this is not true, 
African scholars themselves have been against democracy for countries such as 
Zimbabwe and Kenya mainly due to the belief that Africa should form an ideology 
of its own this has also been echoed throughout the paper. 
 
The third factor encapsulates much of what happened in Africa throughout the 
1980s the era of structural adjustment. More specifically Kenya and Zimbabwe 
represent heavy indebted countries because of the foreign aid era. Both 
countries at some point received  aid.  Zimbabwe received aid from the British 
government as well as other donors and Kenya from the United States and other 
donors.  Programs such as the Millennium Challenge Account emphasized that 
countries need to observe human rights, reduce corruption as well as observe 
democratic values. According to Goldsmith (2001:413) foreign aid encouraged 
democracy, one of the goals of the aid transfer has been to encourage 
democracy or pluralistic national political system where people are reasonably 
free to express their political demands and hold rulers to account. Democracy in 
this sense is not identical with competitive elections held at regular intervals. The 
two do overlap, however elections are often the best tangible evidence to which a 
democratic system is in place.  The aid resulted not in democracy but the 
opposite in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Goldsmith continues to mention that the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had promised to 
give aid to Zimbabwe on the basis of the US Congress’ Zimbabwe Democratic 
Bill. It would give aid pending a certified return to rule of law, respect for 
ownership of property and freedom of speech and association. Goldsmith says 
despite the pressure President Mugabe remained defiant. 
 
 According to Roessler (2005:210) rather than persuade repressive regimes to 
open their political systems, external pressure increased the demands on 
incumbents heightening their sense of vulnerability while empowering opposition 
challenges. In short political conditionalities acted as another threat to the long 
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time autocrats, hold on to power and provoked repressive responses. He 
(2005:211) further says aid blocked the democratization process of highly 
dependent regimes like Kenya and Malawi where the resumption of foreign aid 
flows was contingent upon the holding of multiparty elections which are indicative 
of democracy. 
 
This is not to say aid cannot reach its goals but this has certainly been difficult 
with most countries becoming highly dependent on aid. Africa has experienced a 
continuous cycle of being aid dependent and highly undemocratic. 
 
Democracy in Kenya and Zimbabwe has been a highly contentious issue, in 
recent years both countries have been continuously tested whether they can be 
democratic. They have both since opted for coalition governments.  Levan 
(2001:3) sees power sharing as a response to flawed elections. It has led to 
animated discussions because contemporary cases such as Kenya and 
Zimbabwe raise new questions about government trust, citizen preferences and 
international involvement. This in both countries one would say is proving to be 
challenging democracy. The next chapter will discuss the challenges of elections 
through the lense of elections. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
 
There have been a number of observations picked up from this chapter; 
Looking at the first part of the chapter of it has been noted that democracy in 
general is not an easy ideology to maintain. This is not only true of African or 
developing countries but developed countries as well. This also highlighted that a 
lot of work and effort need to be put from bottom to top approaches which may 
strengthen democracy. At the same there is an ongoing debate about the 
concept democracy itself and what that entails for countries. This does not help 
the added confusion that sits with most scholars and presidents on what 
democracy really is.  
 
The issue of democracy in Africa was also filled with debate with issues ranging 
from the fitness of Africa to handle democracy, highly personalized rule in Africa 
and whether Africa should not form its own ideology due to the fact that 
democracy is not suited for African values because democracy is a western ideal.  
 
 The second part of the chapter discussed the post colonial state in Africa and its 
democratic transitions. It is in the transition phase a country moves from one 
regime to another. As pointed out it is not always true that many transition 
become automatically democratic and on the other hand the countries may sway 
back and forth between democracy and authoritarian regimes. It was noted in the 
section that most African countries from the 1980s onwards had various reasons 
behind democratic transitions; many of them opted for democracy because there 
was a promise of economic prosperity from external actors  
  Finally the aspect of Kenya and Zimbabwe’s democratization processes proved 
to be difficult. At some point or other both these were considered highly 
democratic and they were heading towards economic prosperity. Foreign aid also 
impacted the countries instead of becoming progressively democratic. Aid made 
both countries dependent and susceptible to conditionalities.  
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Leadership has proved to be a challenge towards democratisation. Zimbabwe 
has been ruled by the same leader since independence and Kenya has had 
leaders who opted to cling to their power.  
 
Democracy is a process; it does not flourish overnight and does not flourish on its 
own. Democracy needs to be nurtured it needs to be work for and it needs to be 
worked on. An African country needs to learn to be fit enough for democracy. A 
country as parts of Africa have shown a country does not necessarily need to be 
deemed fit for democracy. 
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Chapter 3 
 
3. Elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe 
“While it is true that elections are at the core of democratic politics, there must be some 
danger that the present obsession with elections will obscure processes of political 
change” Chabal P 1998 
 
Elections form a great part of democracy itself, a country cannot change 
government without having elections. Democracy only means that the people 
have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who want rule them. 
Elections symbolize popular sovereignty and the expression of the social pact 
between the state and the people. Adejumobi (2005:60).  At the end of the day a 
country that is said to have successful elections is consequently said to have 
democratic values. There is a nexus between democracy and elections. 
 
 
Elections whether successful or not carry a message across and are considered 
to be significant in the democratization process particularly in Africa. To re-
emphasise this Lindberg (2006:139) says repeated elections regardless of their 
relative freeness or fairness appear to have positive impact on human freedom 
and democratic values. In addition Adejumobi (2005:50) says elections are still a 
viable means of ensuring the orderly process of leadership succession and 
change; they are an instrument of political authority and legitimation.   
 
Competitive elections are said to be an intergral part of democracy. It is in this 
space where the opposition parties and citizens alike get an opportunity to voice 
out their concerns. It is where society as a whole hands over a report card to the 
government of the day. 
 
This chapter will firstly look at elections in Zimbabwe and Kenya the past, present 
and future trajectories of elections. This will discuss elections gone right and 
those gone wrong as well as the issues surrounding the government of the day. 
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The second aspect of the chapter will discuss the role of opposition parties in 
both countries. This speaks to the issue of competitive elections. The opposition 
together with the citizenry strengthens accountability and legitimizes democracy. 
The third aspect of the chapter will discuss civic engagement; together with 
opposition parties citizens can create a strong democratic force. Full participation 
is important because not only does it promote the people’s needs it helps in 
keeping checks and balances in place. 
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3.1 Past, present and future of elections 
 
Building electoral systems which are effective is necessary to carry out 
democratic values. As noted before elections and democracy go hand in hand, 
this is generally referred to as electoral democracy.  Cowen and Laakso 
(1997:717) say that liberal democratic theory and practice, according to its 
precepts, involves an electoral system which includes the possibility of both 
criticizing government policies and actions and offering alternatives thereby 
enabling a choice to be made between one set of leaders and other and more 
generally holding politicians accountable for their actions.  
 
 
“Meaningful elections were largely unknown during most of the post colonial era. 
Following an initial contest before independence, autocratic, civilian and military 
governments took control in the majority of countries. The entire sub-Saharan 
region (48 countries) held only 126 elections for top national office in 30 years 
through 1989. Most of these elections were non-competitive with an average 
winner’s share of close to 90 percent. The 1990s broke form, during this decade 
African states held 78 leadership elections  or more than half as in the three prior 
decades. All but five countries in the region were involved. These races became 
much tighter. The average winners’ share dropped more than 20 percent points 
to around two thirds of the votes cast. This marked improvement over the slow 
elections typical of the earlier period, though still a lower degree of electoral 
competitiveness that characterizes older systems” Goldsmith (2001:419) 
 
The above traces elections from post colonial period, all efforts to democratize 
and follow all liberal precepts have not been easy. Cowen and Laakso 
(1997:7172) state that since the 1990s more than 30 sub-Saharan states have 
introduced multiparty electoral systems to choose their national governments. 
This development is normally understood as part of the cold war ‘wave of 
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democratisation’ has led many to think that there is something intrinsically new 
about such a competitive process being new in Africa. The actual form and 
content of the electoral process can help gauge the extent to which liberal 
democracy is being realised. 
 
  
Elections do not easily translate into democracy; there are various problems 
within the field. Elkit (1999:28) discuss the fallacy of electoralism which has been 
increasingly recognized. He says it is a problem that aptly denotes the mistake of 
confusing the holding of elections with the advent and development of 
democracy. Electoral systems in Kenya and Zimbabwe have both been marred 
by inconsistency in their elections. The introduction of competitive elections in 
both countries also did not go well. 
 
 
In Kenya the change from one party to multi-party political system affected both 
the administration and legal environments in which elections occurred. Other 
factors that affected elections include ethnicity, clanism, and the nature of 
political parties, personality of individual politicians and in some cases religion. 
Wanyade (2006:62). As for Zimbabwe, according to Kriger (2005:2-3) the ruling 
party Zanu-PF has used the same tactics and strategies from 1980 to 2000 and 
one could say possibly till 2008 general elections. Organized violence and 
intimidation of the opposition, albeit of varying intensity has been the recurring 
strategy of the ruling party before, during and often after elections to punish 
constituencies that dared to oppose it. Other important ruling party electoral 
strategies and tactics such as the use of presidential powers, repressive laws, 
gerrymandering, media control, partisan electoral institutions, state financing of 
parties, and patronage are also present in Zimbabwe. 
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Briefly looking at the electoral history in both countries, one can deduce that 
elections have been problematic for both countries not more than one election 
has been conducted smoothly without bias and irregularities. 
Elections in Zimbabwe have always been an unpredictable area, even the 1980 
elections had issues of cease-fire violations and electoral violence and 
intimidation preoccupied all parties Kriger (2005:4). The focus is not the earlier 
elections but an overview is necessary. Starting from the year 2000 to 2008 the 
situation electoral situation has gotten worse. Despite many irregularities in the 
elections, many observers continued to claim that elections in Zimbabwe were 
free and fair and the people accepted them. 
 
According to Laasko (2002: 438) multi-party elections in independent Zimbabwe 
have always been arranged in the context of an authoritarian political system. He 
says before the year 2000 election observers sent by foreign governments where 
not allowed. Elections in 2000 did not run smoothly due to many factors, the 
country was facing both economic and political turmoil. According to Kadima et al 
(2002) these elections where closer than ever in terms of the race. The election 
days were also peaceful but there was intimidation and violence nonetheless. 
The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was closer to a win with the result 
ZANU PF 47.2 and 62 seats and MDC 45.6 57 seats. The elections did not end 
up in MDC victory but there was an immediate shake up within the ruling party’s 
hierarchy. One could say this election was a success on the basis that the 
opposition gained momentum. 
 
The 2002 presidential elections of 9-11 March were the most significant elections 
in Zimbabwe. They attracted widespread international political attention 
(Raftopoulous 2002:413). Raftopoulous (2002:416) says by early 2002 the 
Mugabe regime had put in place a series of political and legislative measures in 
addition to countrywide structures of violence in preparation for Mugabe’s 
presidential campaign. The violence he says continued to be used as a tool.  
These elections violated almost all SADC (Southern African Development 
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Community) parliamentary forum norms and standards. Voter registration was 
discriminatory and not transparent. Voter education was disrupted and there was 
insufficient time for ESC (Electoral Supervisory Commission) to conduct voter 
education after legislation. This meant that there was insufficient time for the ESC 
to train its 22 000 monitors all of whom where civil servants in particular the army 
and police. There were disturbing episodes of violence even during the polling 
days, opposition polling agents were harassed and prevented from carrying out 
their work. Baker (2002:1147) this indeed shows that the electoral violence 
worsened with this election and these elections were fundamentally flawed. 
According to Raftopoulous (2002:422) the EU and US government had already 
stated that the pre-election conditions in Zimbabwe ruled out the possibility of a 
free and fair election. The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) declared 
that there was no way these elections could be described as substantially free. 
 
According to Baker (2002:1145) Robert Mugabe won the 9-11 march 2002 
presidential election. He was said to have polled 56.2 of the votes cast, while his 
main challenger Morgan Tsvangarai of the MDC was credited with 42 %.  This 
appearantly the nature of elections in Zimbabwe the ruling party always wins. 
 
The 2005 elections presented no difference to that of 2002. According to 
Kagwanja (2005:6) organizing and winning a credible election in 2005 according 
to the thinking of the ruling party ZANU PF stalwarts offered a viable strategy for 
self-rehabilitation and adjustment (the isolation and sanctions imposed by the 
international community). He further says the repressive system of governance 
introduced during the 2002-2004 hiatus remained intact making the platform of 
electoral competition uneven, casting into doubt the freeness and fairness of the 
poll held in 2005. As with other elections ZANU PF won the elections. Elections 
cannot claim success If they continuously fail to transfer power and reflect a 
changing society. 
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The 29 March 2008 elections were a controversial one –candidate presidential 
election run –off. 27 June 2008 that resulted in the disputed re-election of the 
incumbent with an unprecedented 85% of the vote. Consequently Zimbabwe has 
been under a de facto government since March 2008.  According to the Solidarity 
Trust (2008:6) the June election went ahead as a one man race with Mugabe 
winning a landslide victory recording. Badza says Zimbabwe has shown that 
instead of being the necessary or ideal democratic tools for non-violent positive 
political transition in most young democracies of Africa, elections can be 
manipulated to prevent changes to an undesirable status quo. This is most likely 
if some strategic state institutions perceive their deeply entrenched positions and 
interests to be threatened by such necessary changes. 
 
The 2008 produced  turmoil, not only was the MDC robbed of their victory there 
was a lot more violence reported, many people were displaced, killed or arrested. 
According to the Solidarity Trust the period preceding the March elections was 
relatively peaceful, the horrendous violence that marred the period leading up to 
the June election completely undermined the conditions for a free and fair 
elections.Badza (2008:4) says Zimbabwe has a unique party –state political 
system with superficial trappings of political pluralism. There are no visible 
distinctions among the state, the incumbent party and the leader. Consequently 
most if not all institutions of government are perceived to be instruments at the 
service of the party-state. One can only hope that future projections will mean 
that the electoral system is revised to make the state is separated from party 
politics. The coalition government formed where Tsvangarai became prime 
minister has not been working out and will be discussed later in this section. 
 
 
The situation in Kenya has a similar tone to that of Zimbabwe in regards to 
multiparty elections. Multi party elections were introduced in 1992. According to 
Brown (2004:327) a new era of multi party politics begun when Daniel Arap Moi 
repealed the constitutional clause that enshrined the Kenya African National 
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Union (KANU) as the sole party. Moi won the presidential elections and secured 
a majority in parliament in the following two general elections held in December 
1992 and 1997. This was made possible by a blatantly uneven playing field and 
the ruling party’s use of panoply of devious practices ranging from 
gerrymandering and stuffing of ballot boxes to violent intimidation and even 
ethnic cleansing facilitated by the opposition’s fragmentation. For some the 
overall acceptability of the1992 elections flaws and all meant that Kenya had 
undergone a transition to democracy, even if it was not a liberal democracy. 
Similarly BBCNews (1997) says multiparty presidential elections took place on 29 
December 1992. Moi won a fourth term of office. Although the election was 
widely viewed not to be free and fair a commonwealth monitoring group 
assessed that the election outcome reflected the will of the people. 
 
The 1992 elections represented two things: the importance lay in the fact that 
apart from the little general elections held in the aftermath of the split in the ruling 
KANU and the Kenya People’s Union (KPU), they were the first multi party 
general elections since political independence in 1963. Secondly they 
represented an example of an attempt to restructure an authoritarian state 
through political conditionalities.Ajulu (1993:98) these elections presented an 
opportunity for Kenya to build itself economically and politically. Ajulu (1993:100) 
further says like any other elections, the 1992 general elections were questioned 
as to whether they have successful and free and fair. According to Oyugi 
(1992:41) the 1992 general elections showed how ethnicity continued to be a 
major force influencing the behaviour of politicians and voters alike. 
 
 
The 1992 elections represented a beginning a transition not only into democracy 
but into multi party elections. The 1997 presidential elections were expected to 
be somewhat fairer and freer than the 1992 presidential elections. According to 
Ajulu (1997:275-276) the 1997 elections presented a number of situations; it 
allowed political parties to participate, expanded the number of political parties 
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grew rapidly.  The elections almost never happened. The run up to the elections 
had provoked a series of violent confrontation between the security apparatuses 
of the state and the opposition alliance. Ajulu (1997:278) says it became obvious 
that the democratization experiment in Kenya appeared to be getting nowhere. 
Six years after the opening of the democratic space, politics, political institutions 
and the whole concept of governance remains stuck in the authoritarian 
quagmire of the past. Lack of broader participation in decision making process 
and the absence of consensus around important issues of governance appeared 
to be the norm. No progress was made with the 1997 elections in terms of getting 
closer towards liberal democracy.       
 
 
The December 2002 election marked a milestone in a process that had begun a 
dozen years earlier, was comparable to that of landmark votes in Zambia (1991) 
and Malawi (1994), when long-ruling autocrats went down to defeat at the hands 
of aroused elections. Ndegwa (2003:147).  The 2002 presidential elections 
presented success and change considering the change of leadership that these 
elections brought. Ndegwa (2003:148) says comparing 2002’s tallies with the 
presidential results from 1992 and 1997 a number of things can be noted. First, 
the winning candidate won more handily in 2002 than in 1992 and 1997. Moi 
winning 36% in 1992 was not much more than half of the vote share that Kibaki 
picked up ten years later (Kibaki received 20% in 1992 as the opposition vote 
fractured due to ethnic rivalries and machinations of Moi and KANU). In 1997, 
Moi took 41 % to Kibaki’s 31 %. Secondly, Kibaki’s 61 % 2002 share falls 
precisely between the 64% and 58% that all the opposition presidential 
challengers mustered collectively in 1992 and 1997, respectively. This tends to 
support the argument that the opposition wasted excellent chances of capturing 
the presidency on both those previous occasions. Another way of putting it would 
be that the 2002 victory by the opposition was a victory ten years delayed.      
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Kenya was indeed fortunate that these elections were successful. They showed 
how resilient the citizenry can be in demanding liberal democracy and in showing 
the government how badly they were performing. These elections have proved 
that the electorate can have a significant voice in political debates.  However this 
being the case the 2007 showed a level of regression politically in Kenya mainly 
due to ethnicity. 
 
According to Kwaja (2009:40) Politics in Kenya in the run up to the 2007 
elections was no doubt influenced by ethnic concerns; voters, parties and policies 
were distinctly placed along ethnic cleavages. The incumbent, Mwai Kibaki is 
Kikuyu and his main rival who is the front runner Raila Odinga is Luo. Class is not 
the only reliable predictor of political loyalties and voting behaviour. Even more 
powerful are the constructed identities of ethnicity or religion. Elections in Kenya 
from 1992 to 2007 have shown how determined the political class is to cling to 
power and not mind the cost implication to the system.  The United Nations 
report (2008:7) states that the period leading up to the elections was marred by 
several incidents of violence which were directly or indirectly related to the 
campaign itself. Meanwhile in it’s monitoring of the pre-election the human rights 
situation in 79 Constituencies, the NGO Kenya Human Rights Commission 
(KHRC) reported 36 cases of political violence that left at least 20 people dead 
and more than 60 injured. 
 
This scenario already paints a dim picture of the 2007 elections were going to 
turn out. Beyond issues of ethnicity the need for PNU to hold on to power like Moi 
was disturbing. Kwaja (2009:38) notes that without genuine political competition 
there is no realistic chance for change according to the will of the electorate, the 
fundamentals of electoral democracy are undermined. 
 
According to Dagne (2008:2) on December 27 2007, millions of Kenyans went to 
the polls in Kenya’s fourth multi-party elections, with the hope of strengthening 
the institutions of democracy and most importantly of bringing about change. 
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Several months before the December elections a number of polls indicated that 
the incumbent president trailed behind opposition candidate Raila Odinga.  
Although the polls suggested that Raila Odinga would win there was a delay in 
announcing the results. Dagne (2008:3) further says that president Kibaki was 
quickly sworn in as president while international and domestic election observers 
declared the election rigged and deeply flawed. The EU report concluded that the 
2007 General elections fell short of key international and regional standards for 
democratic elections. Most significantly they were marred by a lack of 
transparency in the processing and tallying of presidential results, which raises 
concern about the accuracy of the final results of the elections. 
 
The 2007 elections as a democratic experience failed. According to the UN report 
(2008:1) at the end of December widespread violence broke out in Kenya 
following the announcement of the results of the presidential elections on 27 
December 2007. a lot more violence and speculation occurred after these 
elections and just like Zimbabwe, Kenya had to go into a coalition government 
with Mwai Kibaki as the president and Raila Odinga as the prime minister, this 
after much negotiation and mediation. This aspect will be discussed later in this 
section as to whether coalition governments are successful and whether Kenya 
and Zimbabwe have succeeded.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
In order to deduce whether Kenya and Zimbabwe are capable of having free and 
fair elections, one needs to find out what kind of democracies they are. According 
to Elklit (1999:29) Kenya and Zimbabwe can be described as pseudo 
democracies, which are less than minimally democratic but still distinct from 
purely authoritarian regimes. They have legal opposition parties and perhaps 
many other constitutional features of electoral democracy, but fail to meet one of 
its crucial requirements: a sufficiently fair arena of contestation to allow the ruling 
party to be turned out of power. Pseudo- democracies obviously take different 
forms but the common denomination is that they tolerate the existence of 
opposition parties. 
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The above could to some extent explain what the situation has been in Kenya 
and Zimbabwe. At some point or another in both countries the ruling party was 
set in stone and no one could move it from power. To this day it is a difficulty 
facing the opposition parties. How then can elections be free and fair when the 
slate is not balanced? Elklit (1999:33) says one can question to a considerable 
degree what actually happens before the polling day and even before the 
electoral process started. He says the focus has to be on the pre-polling period if 
one’s intention is to improve the quality of elections in a democratic perspective, 
he implies stressing the presence of ,respect for and unhindered use of relevant 
political and civil rights and freedoms. He further says free and fair elections are 
the culmination of the process not the beginning. Until other rights and liberties 
are firmly protected free and fair elections cannot take place. 
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3.2 Opposition parties: for or against democracy 
 
Opposition was regarded as essential for a democratic process. One of the 
practical rules of politics which works out in normal functioning democracies is 
when there is open party competition and free elections, parties, governments 
and opposition seek the support of the large middle spectrum of voters. 
Democracy does not divide political parties but instead exerts a constant pull on 
the parties drawing them together. Cowen and Laakso (1997:726) 
 
Competitive elections are just as important in maintaining a balanced view and in 
enabling effective power transfers. In general terms competitive elections do give 
the constituency options.  Cowen and Laakso (1997: 726) further say that the 
opposition neutralizes extremists. The party competition is basically not divisive 
as commonly thought but unifying instead. Bogaards (2000:163) has noted that 
what stands out at the end of the decade is the seeming paradox that the re-
introduction of multi party elections and the demise of one party state has 
resulted in one party dominance and single party rule in so many countries. 
Either the authoritarian regime has managed to cling to power through the ballot 
box or a democratic opposition has won an absolute majority in the transition 
elections and consolidated its position since. Looking at the case studies at hand 
one can say that Zimbabwe and Kenya fit this mould. The reigning authoritarian 
regime in Zimbabwe has kept its power through the ballot box. Although Kenya 
has embarked on a coalition government one party governed the country for 
decades before transferring power partially. 
 
The opposition or political parties are significant for a number of reasons; 
according to LeBas (2005:4) parties are crucial institutions of democracy they 
structure political competition, aggregate social interests, serve as a primary link 
between elites and masses and even build trust in democratic institutions. 
Bogaards (2000:171) shares similar views, he says opposition parties have three 
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functions namely; they constitute an alternative government. Secondly they 
provide an institutional outlet for dissent and lastly they criticize the government 
of the day in public debates. In addition Randall and Svasand (2002:30) 
emphasise that no political order can be democratic which does not rest on the 
right of citizens who are entitled to vote in or out the highest officials. However 
the political party is the most effective vehicle for mobilizing voter support for 
electoral office. The institution of a multiparty system is indispensable to the 
principle and practice of democracy. 
 
It is important to note that in most cases the weakness of popular opposition has 
facilitated continued rule by incumbent authoritarian elites (LeBas 2005:1).  
According to Cowen and Laakso (1997:730) the weak institutionalisation of 
parties in the multiparty system makes that system extremely fragile. The step 
from many parties to no parties system is extremely fragile. The process of 
changing from many parties to no parties and from no parties to many parties is 
an easy one. In their institutional weaknesses, the no-party system and the 
multiparty system resemble each other. They may resemble each other because 
they both require a lot of structure and mobilisation. The point to emphasise is 
that elections since 1990s have generally been multi-party, and that the 
strategies of many African governing regimes have been directed precisely at 
making opposition parties as institutionally weak as possible. 
 
The above is a view that has been studied over a period of time. It does seem 
that even with the introduction of multi party system, Africa still has major 
obstacles in fully democratizing, and as noted above opposition party is also an 
intergral part of the democratization process. 
 
In the post independence period Zimbabwe had opposition parties. According to 
Kriger (2005:3) some of the parties were the United African National Council 
(UNAC) and ZUM (Zimbabwe Unity Movement). Opposition politics in Zimbabwe 
have always taken place on an even plane; Kriger (2005:6) says that for the 1985 
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presidential elections ZANU-PF promoted a one party state. This makes it clear 
why Zimbabwe is still a one party state and just tolerates opposition parties. 
Zimbabwe had a few rivals but they were pushed out due to a unity accord that 
was signed between ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union) and ZANU to 
form ZANU PF. According to Kriger (2005:13) a unity accord was signed between 
ZANU and ZAPU. He says other parties like ZUM (Zimbabwe Unity Movement) 
and CAZ (Conservative Alliance of Rhodesia) tried to emerge in the 1990s but 
intimidation and violence was used to make the parties loose elections. 
 
In Zimbabwe, the opposition ZAPU survived the shift from Proportional 
Representation (PR) to plurality for the 1985 elections quite well due to the 
concentration of its electorate. In 1980 under PR the results were ZANU (57), 
ZAPU (20) and UNAC (3). In 1985, under plurality the results were ZANU (64), 
ZAPU (15) and ZANU (Sithole) (1).The disappearance of opposition in Zimbabwe 
is the result of the unity accord in 1987 between ZAPU and the ruling ZANU of 
President Robert Mugabe, under very strong pressure from the latter. A new 
opposition party ZUM which contested the 1990 parliamentary elections obtained 
11% of the vote but only two of the one hundred and twenty seats in parliament. 
Bogaards (2000:169) 
 
Whether under PR or plurality ZANU PF continued to dominate, the likelihood of 
the situation allowing fair participation of other parties seemed impossible. 
According to Kriger (2005:31) opponents were cast as reactionary enemies of the 
state, distinguished in 1990, 1995 and 2000 as mere puppets of the whites. The 
MDC provided a chance to break the mould and fight for the right to oppose. 
Compagnon (2000:449) says the MDC was launched in September 1999. 
According to Kriger (2005:13) the MDC’s presence was largely felt in the 2000 
elections when it clearly rejected a draft of the constitution that would support 
land confiscation of the whites. 
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MDC has shown since then that democracy is important and is necessary. The 
party always strives for democracy to be realized in Zimbabwe. The ruling party 
has only sought to suppress their every effort even by means of violence and 
intimidation. 
 
The hunger for an opposition has always existed in Kenyan politics. According to 
Muigai (1993:26) widespread discontent followed the 1988 elections translated 
into demand for the end of a one party rule and the introduction of plural politics. 
The more the demand grew the more the KANU government insisted that plural 
politics was not suited for Kenya and it would never allow the re-introduction of 
opposition parties. 
 
According to Ndegwa (1998:193-194) in 1991 the government legalized 
opposition parties rather than a wholesale revision of the authoritarian state that 
had been molded over the previous two decades. The euphoric celebration and 
anticipation of an end to the unpopular KANU rule soon proved to be for naught. 
It became abundantly clear in the run up to the general election of December 
1992 when the incumbent party took advantage of institutional devices legally in 
its grasp to overwhelm the divided opposition. Muigai (1993:26) says the reason 
Kenya accepted a multiparty system was in order to continue receiving aid. In 
1990 the United States Ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone, fired the first 
salvo when in a speech to Kenyan businessmen stated that the US would give 
preference in its grants of foreign aid to those countries which nourished 
democratic institutions, defended human rights and practiced multiparty politics. 
This is why Kenya opted to change its political system on the surface but the 
depth of its system remained authoritarian. 
 
The opposition in Kenya has also faced a lot of challenges. According to Muigai 
(1993:30) the first challenges are based on resources. The lack of distinction 
between party and state gave KANU the advantage of employing the massive 
state machinery and tremendous financial resources in its campaign. Secondly 
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the chief secretary of the civil service warned civil servants that they must 
support the government of the day and  dismissed the notion of political 
neutrality. Thirdly, in a number of cases the registrar took too long granting 
registration of parties, thereby in effect denying the parties valuable organization 
time. In some cases the registrar refused registration outright. 
 
The opposition in Kenya according to Muigui (1993:32) is weak because it is 
composed of loose coalitions; there remains an inherent instability in each party.  
Raila Odinga in the current Kenyan context formed a coalition with Mwai Kibaki 
and helped Kibaki win the 2002 elections. When the time came for Kibaki and his 
party to transfer power they wanted yet another term, which shows that parties in 
Kenya have always wanted to hold on to power for as long as they can. This was 
very undemocratic on the PNU’s party. However ODM as the opposition which 
can be likened to MDC has always wanted democracy to prevail. These parties 
have now been compromised for the sake of democracy to have power sharing 
agreements or coalition governments after the respective elections of 2007 and 
2008. 
 
 According to Cowen and Laakso (1997: 726) the forms of disunity that 
characterize governments in new nations are thus often premature. Equally, an 
opposition which fears and mistrusts the government of the day helps to magnify 
the fears of a majority party leadership that the opposition in its efforts to achieve 
power is out to destroy all. In those first years of self government both sides need 
to recognize how absolutely necessary each is to each other.  
 
 
This is why the power sharing agreements in each country have served a 
peaceful purpose and were meant for the ruling parties and opposition parties to 
work together. According to Moghalu (2008:34) the response of the mediators 
and protagonists in these crises in Kenya and Zimbabwe has been to negotiate 
power-sharing deals- coalition governments in which the previous government 
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and the opposition govern jointly. He further says this approach is not unique to 
Africa and has been applied in Northern Ireland. It has been controversial and 
raises the question of whether it is likely to become a convenient route for 
despots to thwart the will of the people in democratic elections in Africa. One can 
also see that citizens may be robbed of their choices due to power sharing, 
although citizens may opt for this choice if it brings peace and stops the violence. 
 
Moghalu states that in Kenya despite widely expressed reservations, the deal 
negotiated by Kofi Annan, the former secretary general of the United Nations, 
which was signed by Kibaki and Odinga has held so far. The Kenyan agreement 
known as the National Accord and Reconciliation Act created the post of 
executive prime minister for Odinga and it was expressly stipulated that it would 
be written into the Kenyan constitution. In Zimbabwe a power sharing deal was 
brokered by Thabo Mbeki, former president of South Africa, and it was signed by 
Mugabe, Tsvangarai and Arthur Mutambara, a second opposition leader in 
September 2008. 
 
According to the CNN (12 December 2009) Mugabe said the fragile power 
sharing government in his country has been given a short life and he intends to 
reclaim control through new elections. Mugabe’s remarks come after renewed 
tension between him and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangarai. The two formed a 
power sharing deal after months of controversy. The unity government has 
bickered constantly since it was formed in February 2009. The situation in 
government has worsened to the point that the Prime Minister and his Party 
boycotted parliament months into the coalition government”. According to Baldauf 
(2009) Morgan Tsvangarai had disengaged from the power sharing deal after 
one of MDC leaders was arrested on charges of terrorism. Banya (2009) says 
Mugabe shrugged of the opposition boycott of Zimbabwe’s unity government 
saying he would not yield to pressure to make concessions. 
+ 
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  The unity government has been met with continuous challenges. Tsvangarai 
and his MDC party stopped attending cabinet meetings in protest against the 
arrest of a senior official and Mugabe’s refusal to implement a political pact in full. 
This was around October 2009. However the MDC has since returned to 
parliament. 
 
The situation in Zimbabwe is slowly progressing. There are lessons that can be 
learnt from this situation. According to Moghalu (2008:35) first and foremost 
Mugabe only succumbed to a deal due to a combination of factors. The pressure 
that was placed on Mugabe by his fellow leaders in Southern Africa as well as  
Mugabe’s loss of support among African leaders in the African Union (AU) and 
the dire economic situation  of Zimbabwe. 
 
After a year of the coalition government, some scholars do think that the 
government has made progress in some areas and some remain skeptic. 
According to VOA (10 February 2010) interview of Morgan Tsvangarai MDC 
leader a lot of progress has been made in the country. Progress on the economic 
front has been made given Zimbabwe’s economic situation at the end of 2008.  
Tsvangarai acknowledged that the pace is slow on the democratisation front. The 
government staying together after many disputes is also an achievement. The 
unity government has managed to revitalize the public health system which had 
collapsed as well as reopen schools after endless strikes by teachers. 
 
Steinberg (11 Feb 2010) agrees with the argument that the unity government in 
Zimbabwe has had some successes. He says the unity government is functioning 
and civil servants are back at work, being paid a small stipend. The Zim dollar 
has been shelved in favour of stable foreign currency and goods have returned to 
shops. Human rights activists continue to report a decline in abuses especially in 
urban settings. An ambitious yet pragmatic reconstruction programme was 
generally well-received by foreign donors and Bretton Woods Institutions. 
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This shows that there has been progress made by the Zimbabwean government 
despite most scholars and commentators stating that the progress has been 
minimal. Steinberg (11 February 2010) says that there four challenges ahead for 
the Zimbabwean government. Firstly parties must complete the remaining GPA, 
secondly the constitution must be reformed, and thirdly there must be 
preparations for new elections. Lastly top securocrats whose power and future 
are threatened by change must be brought to their heels. 
 
Unlike Kenya’s deal, the Zimbabwe deal was only a framework agreement which 
left several critical details unaddressed.  Secondly power sharing reduces the risk 
of violence but does not address the underlying factors that create conflict in 
African democracies but it provides an umbrella under which groups in political 
conflict may feel adequately(though not optimally) represented to pursue a more 
long term solution to the underlying issues. Thirdly he says power sharing 
agreements in post election contexts are transitional arrangements but could also 
become permanent features of governance architecture (Moghalu 2008:38) lastly 
points to the issue of electoral commissions. He says without independent 
electoral commissions as organizers and umpires it is difficult to avoid electoral 
manipulations. 
 
he points out  that the fact that power sharing could be a  permanent feature 
might not be suited to the African context and it runs a risk of being chosen as 
the first option. It is concerning because a lot of time scholars suggest that 
certain things are not suited to the African context but they fail to suggest what 
Africa needs. However if it is a necessary evil then it must be done for the sake of 
peace. Being an opponent to a ruling party that sees itself in power indefinitely is 
a continuous challenge. Opposition parties need to remain strong at all times. 
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3.3 Citizen participation and the electoral process 
 
Democracy as a system was created for and by citizens hence it is supposed to 
enhance and support civil liberties at all costs. According to Sithole (1993:35) 
unless democracy is sustained by the inner strength of a given society, the 
democracy project is built on quicksand and may last as long as favourable 
conditions last. Democracy should find its sustainability from the inner strength of 
a society, not outside it. Similarly Kitschelt (2000:845) says democracy is the only 
political regime in which institutional rules of competition between candidates 
aspiring to exercise authority make rulers accountable and responsive to the 
political preference which is distributed among all competent citizens. In 
normative political theory this counts as a strong argument in favour of 
democracy. This point to citizens at the centre of democracy, unless they 
demand accountability, transparency and a strong practice of democratic values 
then governments will ignore their civil liberties. 
 
 
Voters are often marred by various decisions that they have to make in order to 
choose who best represents them. More often than not voters are not well 
informed, they vote for a party if they are intimidated or get paid to do so. 
According to Kitschelt (2000:848) Voters do not know how their preference for a 
particular politician is likely to affect the ultimate outcomes of democracy decision 
making. Even elected legislators face cycling majorities and cannot know how to 
affect the policy outcome. Parties he says need to address this problem of social 
choice by working out a joint preference ranking supported by multiple politicians. 
Voters in turn, may then more clearly anticipate how their choice will affect 
binding, collective democratic outcomes of the policy making problems. 
 
One cannot over emphasize the important role that is played by citizens in the 
electoral process. With information as a tool and understanding the impact of 
their decisions as citizens, they can understand how to participate more 
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effectively. According to Laakso and Cowen (1997:738) voters have been known 
to counter party irresponsibility by opting to conceal their own thoughts and 
actions. Some have been heard to say after elections in Africa: 'I willingly took 
money from Mr. [X] but deliberately voted against him'. It is difficult to disentangle 
the effects of manipulation from the feedback which follows when reactions are 
incorporated into governmental intentions themselves. One can see that electoral 
practices are sometimes changing due to socio-economic pressures. 
 
This shows the clientist nature of the electoral process that voters often engage 
in across Africa. Kitschelt (2000:849) says resource-rich but vote poor 
constituencies provide politicians with money in exchange for material favours, 
dispensed by politicians when they are in empowered with public office. This 
exchange builds up practices of rent seeking and market distortion. 
Constituencies buy protection against market uncertainty. Vote-rich but resource 
poor constituencies receive selective material incentives before and after 
elections in exchange for surrendering their role. The material goods involved in 
the exchange range from gifts in kind and entertainment before elections. 
 
 
Chazan (1982:170) notes that there are two types of participation that have been 
apparent in post independent Africa: formal and non-formal participation. The 
possibility of engaging in formal participatory politics has varied drastically from 
country to country and from time to time it is possible to demonstrate significant 
in formal and steady increments in non formal participatory effects. Non-formal 
ways of participation are an outgrowth of traditional forms of political association. 
 
 
The term political participation has been highly contested. Some even call it civic 
engagement. There many movements that try hard to promote political 
participation of civilians across the world from Ukraine to Brazil. Chazan further 
says the term political participation has itself been defined in different ways by a 
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variety of observes. She says some have used political participation to mean 
political acts. Others have utilized the term in a general sense to mean action 
which is directed at influencing (controlling, changing, supporting or sharing in) 
policy making and /or execution in a political structure. One key analyst of 
participation in Africa she says has stated that “to become involved in politics is 
to participate”. For some the political act especially of voting constitutes the 
ultimate sign of political participation. According to a UNDP report (2002:1) 
development practitioners have focused traditionally on the resources and 
capacities that exist among state agencies, and potential for voluntary and 
collective action by citizens themselves has been relatively ignored. The report 
defines civic engagement as a process not an event that closely involves people 
in the economic, social, cultural and political processes that affect their lives. 
Chazan (1982:171) says political participation encompasses political structures 
and actions whose purpose is to influence and facilitate the influencing of political 
decisions through the involvement of citizens. 
 
Kenya and Zimbabwe have active civil society organizations and yet participation 
from  citizens is very limited . This can be due to citizens engaging politically only 
through party systems. Many times they are even afraid to declare political views 
in fear of violence and intimidation.Tiwana (2009) says citizens should be invited 
to actively participate in the constitution –making process. Their active 
involvement should also be sought in election monitoring by both government 
agencies and civil society when actual voting is carried out. He says there is a 
need for public information programmes to inform citizens about their civic rights. 
Information seems to be a great part of the problem. According to Kitschelt 
(2000:851) in representative democracy citizens do not choose issues but 
politicians in geographical districts. These representatives are charged with 
representing their constituencies over an uncertain range of issues. This enables 
voters to anticipate candidate positions on issues in which voters do not know the 
parties positions or in which parties do not have positions. Parties must signal to 
voters more fundamental principles for generating policy stances that would 
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apply to new and unforeseeable political issue conflicts. He says the second 
problem is that voters are information misers and typically lack the time and 
resources to review the candidates and parties’ specific issue positions. Instead 
they are looking for simple and underlying principles according to which parties 
generate issue stances 
 
 
Voters need to know that their voices are important and they can put pressure on 
governments to be accountable and responsible. There have been cases where 
voters were successful in letting their respective governments know that they are 
not happy. According to Laakso and Cowen (1997:732), voters could and did 
punish politicians they did not like, In Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, 
surprisingly large numbers of incumbents have been defeated by voters unhappy 
with their performance. Such results occur in both one-party states and in highly 
competitive systems. 
 
 
There are various recommendations on how to get citizens to participate in the 
electoral process. Laakso and Cowen (1997:743) have their own set of 
recommendations. The first is the renewal of the right to organise and support 
political parties, including freedom of association, assembly, and expression of 
opinions not only in private but also in public (even 'to insult' figures of authority), 
and secondly above all freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture. 
These gains have been hard won and are generally popular. Yet, the extent of 
mass voter apathy, similarly relative and uneven, means that the second force of 
democratization, multi-party elections, may be nothing more than another form of 
manipulation by political elites, sometimes called an elective dictatorship. This it 
can reasonably be argued has been foisted upon reluctant incumbent parties, 
including freedom of association, assembly, and expression of opinions not only 
in private but also in public (even 'to insult' figures of authority), and above all 
freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture. These gains have been hard 
won and are generally popular. Yet, the extent of mass voter apathy, similarly 
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relative and uneven, means that the second force of democratization, multi-party 
elections, may be nothing more than another form of manipulation by political 
elites, sometimes called an elective dictatorship. This it can reasonably be 
argued has been foisted upon reluctant incumbent. 
 
The UNDP report (2002:9) suggests a number of things as well. Firstly it says 
governments must include non-state actors in development initiatives as a 
potential source of enhancing ownership and participatory governance. Secondly 
the institutional framework for effective engagement requires access to relevant 
information. Thirdly expanding the participatory process to include marginalized 
groups can multiply their capacity to improve their own welfare. Fourthly capacity 
building for engagement can help citizens play an informed role in policy 
decisions and create political space. Lastly civic oversight is a reservoir of 
political, economic, cultural and moral resources to check the accountability and 
transparency of state institutions. 
 
 
These are some of the things that citizens can embark on in order to have a 
strong hold over their own electoral process. Democracy cannot exist without an 
active and aware citizenry. Ultimately it is up to the people to decide what kind of 
society they would like to have and what kind of government they would like to 
rule. 
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3.4Conclusion 
 
This chapter has highlighted the scope of difficulty in terms of elections and 
democracy. Some might perceive elections to be events that happen outside of 
democracy while others think that democratic elections should be conducted a 
certain way. Elections and democracy go hand in hand. 
 
Looking at the first part which examined the past, present and future of elections, 
several things can be noted. Countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe have 
continuously engaged in elections for a number of reasons. First to show how 
democratic they are and secondly to be perceived domestically and 
internationally as democratic and lastly for financial aid they had to show that 
they respected civil rights and democracy. Elections have to be free and fair, they 
have to adequately represent the voices of the citizens. Elections also do not 
easily translate into democracy. Both Kenya and Zimbabwe have used elections 
as an instrument to implement undemocratic behavior at one point or another. 
What this section showed us is that the elections in both countries were marred 
with irregularities and violence which often than not were strategies of the ruling 
parties. Generally elections and their significance cannot be taken lightly and 
need to be structured, monitored and observed. Citizens need to be involved 
from the beginning before the polling day. 
Opposition parties have a hard task of breaking the mold in authoritarian 
countries. They are necessary for competitive elections to take place; they create 
a sense of balance and represent different views. Both countries still have a long 
way to go in this regard. Even with civil participation in the electoral process, 
education and information are necessary in order for civilians to engage 
consciously and effectively. Zimbabwe and Kenya politically and economically 
still have to make choices and decisions that are different to those made in the 
past, that show their commitment to their countries, their people and to 
democracy 
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Chapter 4  
4. How fair are fair elections: electoral violence in Kenya  
 
“Our bloody elections are part of the tribute we pay for making a fetish of something we could 
have thrown away. Such a pattern of repetitive violence cannot be dismissed as merely 
circumstantial. The problem is systemic, systemic problems cannot be solved through 
improvisation. They require solutions that go back to institutional causes” 
Ayi Kwei Armah, 2009 
 
Elections are an important way of determining how democratic a country is. 
Countries in Africa have embraced elections as a path towards democratic 
transitions. The role of elections has often been confused as a tool for aid; if a 
country holds elections the international community will view that country as 
democratic. One aspect of elections that has been difficult in Africa or particularly 
in Kenya is the concept of power transfer that ought to happen through elections. 
Many African countries resisted multiparty democracy and elections and opted 
for one party states and authoritarian regimes. 
Amongst other electoral patterns, the issue of electoral violence has been an 
ongoing problem within Kenya. The electoral violence points to the issues 
whether elections that are marred by violence are free and fair.  A few elections 
in Kenya have gone without the violence and disruption. There are a number of 
reasons for this violence such as ethnicity which is a major aspect in Kenya’s 
political arena. Klopp and Kamungi (2008:12) say that though politicians fanned 
ethnic animosity this does not adequately explain the violence. 
 
This chapter attempts to briefly look at electoral violence in Kenya. The chapter 
will look at who caused the electoral violence, citizens’ response, the role of 
external actors in making sure the violence subsides and democracy is 
maintained and the causes of this electoral violence over time. The chapter looks 
at the 2007 elections where the violence went to extreme levels and caused 
concern world wide. 
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4.1 Issues of electoral violence in Kenya  
The elections of December 2007 were the most disturbing elections in Kenya’s 
political history. The violence that ensued after the elections results  caused 
mixed reactions both domestically and internationally. According to Murithi 
(2009:1) the violence following the proclamation of the results of 2007 
presidential elections in Kenya was one of the most violent and destructive 
period’s in the country’s history. According to Lafargue (2008:1) the widespread 
violence and turmoil that followed the December 2007 presidential elections will 
undoubtedly leave a mark on Kenyan politics for a long time. These elections 
destabilized Kenya as a nation and its people; a lot of people had doubts about 
the democracy that elections are theoretically meant to bring. 
 
Many scholars have pinpointed many reasons why these elections produced this 
kind of violence. According to Calas (2008:171) the ethnicising of violence does 
not seem to be clear while the localization of violence in the country is more often 
as a result of land issues rather than direct ethnic antagonism. In contrast crime 
in urban areas has taken the form of unequivocal ethnicisation. Klopp and 
Kamungi (2008:13) state that the violence in Kenya may have been shocking but 
from a historical perspective it was less surprising. Kenya has been under 
repressive government since its colonial formation nearly half a century ago. 
Kenya has a parliament; the president’s office has enormous concentrated 
power, including power over land allocations, a key resource in an economy 
reliant on agriculture and tourism. 
 
This alludes to the fact that the poor and the marginalized were fed up of a 
system that did not enable them to empower themselves over long period of time. 
Many citizens thought that the December 2007 presidential elections will bring a 
change. Further more Klopp and Kamungi say that the historical misallocation of 
property through the executive branch helps explain the salience of land issues 
as a focus of presidential campaigns, especially in the Rift Valley and along the 
coast. 
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According to Zounmenou (2009) the were a number of causes of electoral 
violence in Kenya; the lack of KEC independence, the reluctance to accept 
legitimate political competition, the breakdown of conflict management 
mechanisms as well as ethnic manipulation. Other reasons he cites include the 
existence of youth militias, incitement and illiteracy. Klopp and Kamungi reiterate 
the kind of violence that existed. They (2008:12) say that politicians used 
ethnicity to mobilize votes and deliberately create divisions between the Kikuyu 
who largely voted for the PNU and the Luo and Kalenjin who voted largely for the 
ODM. Some local language radio stations made the situation worse by 
broadcasting inflammatory or hateful messages. 
 
 Maupeu (2008:201) says that the cause of the problem is neither tribalism nor 
politics but rather a long simmering history of glaring poverty and despair, which  
reached a boiling point with a generation of young Kenyans to whom basic 
opportunities  were not given. (Maupeu 2008:210) further says that all analysts 
have stressed that electoral violence is a recurrent problem in Kenya’s 
democratization process. It is intimately linked to land policies of the post colonial 
state particularly those of the first president Jomo Kenyatta. 
 
Kenya’s political landscape has always been marred by issues of inequality, 
marginalization and ethnic tensions. It is very unfortunate that the citizens 
continue to suffer at the hands of privileged elite. Using ethnicity as a driving 
point has certainly been a mistake that the presidents and parties continue to 
make. Democracy is not about race or ethnicity; it is about merging different 
views and allowing people to participate in the political space that has been 
created on an equal footing. The unfortunate effect of the political space that was 
inherited means that proceedings do not happen on an equal footing. According 
to Kwaja (2009:39) ethnicity in Kenya is tied in complex and contradictory ways 
to enduring legacies of uneven regional development. During colonial rule central 
Kenya, the homeland of the Kikuyu became the heartland of the settler economy, 
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while Nyanza, the Luo homeland languished as a labour reserve that furnished 
both unskilled and educated labour to the centers of colonial capitalism. Not 
surprisingly, the Kikuyu bore the brunt of capitalism and socialization and were in 
the vanguard of the nationalist struggles that led to the decolonization and they 
came to dominate the post colonial state and economy. This is the history Kenya 
has one that is encrypted with inequality it is then difficult of break free from this 
solid cycle. 
 
 Many scholars have defined electoral violence in various ways. Zounmenou 
(2009) defines electoral violence as any random or organized act or threat to 
intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder in seeking 
to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence an electoral process. According to 
Maupeu (2008:196) electoral violence can be defined as any act or set of acts 
that harm or threaten to harm individuals or groups of people, to cause some 
damage to property: If the acts or the set of acts are aimed at or have the effect 
of manipulation on the choice of the election results. The damage can be 
physical, psychological or both. Electoral violence can occur before, during or 
after an election. Similarly Strauss and Taylor (2009:7-8) say ”that a study of 
electoral violence should acknowledge that neither violence nor electoral violence 
is a concept with a consistent social scientific definition. For some authors like 
Collier violence ranges from civil war to riots, to political strikes and assignations. 
The dependent variable for state failure (including violence) is a dummy variable 
for the formation of militias. The broadest level by violence or political violence 
we mean the deliberate use of harm or the threat of physical harm for a political 
purpose. Electoral violence refers to physical violence and coercive intimidation 
directly tied to an impending electoral contest or to an announced electoral 
result”. 
 
One can say that as much as electoral violence cannot have a consistent 
definition, there is a common thread in the above definitions. The thread is an 
acknowledgement that electoral violence is harmful in one way or the other and 
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that electoral violence happens before, during and after the end of an electoral 
contest. 
 
One other important thing to note is that electoral violence can be used as a tool 
to achieve various impacts. Strauss and Taylor (2009:8) say elections are always 
formal contests between incumbents and challengers, and thus they propose that 
incumbents and challengers will generally use violence for different reasons and 
in different circumstances. Incumbents more often than not employ violence to 
maintain power using the coercive means of the state, while challengers use 
violence to protest outcomes using non-state means. 
 
 Klopp and Kamungi (2008:12) say that Odinga has been the Member of 
Parliament for Langata, a division of the Kibera slum. He has a history of stirring 
up ethnic tensions as a part of his campaign strategy. They (2008:14) further say 
that another key legacy of violence can be traced back to the 1990s when multi 
party politics was reintroduced in December 1991. politicians in the then 
dominant KANU party whipped up ethnic hatred and displaced, disenfranchised 
members of rival communities as a means to hold on to power. Klopp and 
Kamungi (2008:15) say that violence on both sides of PNU and ODM remains a 
key issue and has altered the political landscape and thus options for a resolution 
for the disputed election. 
 
The 2007 December elections changed the landscape in various ways; they 
highlighted ethnicity as an issue that has been common in Kenyan politics. This 
caused a split between citizens who ensued violence on ethnic terms and on 
socio-economic terms. The elections highlighted the need for both electoral 
reform and constitutional reform to make sure that electoral violence whether 
post or pre elections does not happen in Kenya. 
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4.2 Role of Civilians in the electoral violence 
The role of civilians is double-edged, the one side points to civilians who take 
incentives such as money  in order to instigate violence and cause turmoil for the 
opposition or ruling party and the other side shows a citizenry that has been 
displaced, that is becoming apathetic and that has lost many relatives and 
friends. This role is not an easy one in a country with a history of marginalization 
that is ranked according to ethnicity. 
 
It seems as though the citizens had already decided who was going to be their 
next president. According to Calas (2008:178) the protest and general vote which 
was higher in urban centers played out in favour of the ODM. But as the elections 
came this did not become the case. The post election violence resulted in 1000 
deaths and 300 000 people were displaced.  It is evident that the violence of 
these elections affected citizens the most. Zounmenou (2009) acknowledges that 
citizens had a role in the electoral violence and they were among the major 
actors. He says some citizens engaged in direct acts of violence against 
supporters of other factions. 
 
What must be realized is that citizens have a difficult role in the electoral process. 
They are often torn between incentives and doing the right thing. The previous 
chapter mentioned the clientist relationship that can happen between poor 
constituencies and the political parties. Kitschelt (2000:849) says resource-rich 
but vote poor constituencies provide politicians with money in exchange for 
material favours, dispensed by politicians when they are in empowered in public 
office. This exchange builds up practices of rent seeking and market distortion. 
Constituencies buy protection against market uncertainty. Vote-rich but resource 
poor constituencies receive selective material incentives before and after 
elections in exchange for surrendering their role. The material goods involved in 
the exchange range from gifts in kind and entertainment before elections. This is 
what happened in Kenya and this is the position that citizens find hard to resist. 
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In terms of the electoral violence, according to Dercon (2008:1) before the 
election, more than half the Kenyans were interviewed expressed fear of political 
violence. Only 16 percent of respondents stated that they were unconcerned 
about becoming a victim of violence of intimidation during elections. Kikuyus 
were significantly concerned with 66 percent stating that they always or often 
feared violence compared with 84 percent of the Luo respondents. Similarly 
supporters of Mwai Kibaki were worried about the violence than supporters of 
Raila Odinga.This is based on a sample of 1207 eligible voters who were 
interviewed in 76 of Kenya’s 210 electoral constituencies.  
 
The problem that affects citizens is the fact that they are not given enough 
information about the issues at hand and they are not given a chance or space 
for their voices to come through. According to Sisk (2008:3) when citizens are 
provided a direct voice in political life, society’s trust of willingness to cooperate 
with the state in achieving development is strengthened. As such electoral 
processes are very much about the peaceful management of social conflict 
through public dialogue, vigorous debate and authoritative selection of leaders 
through electoral values. That is a good electoral process will allow society on its 
own to determine the nature of its similarities and differences. 
 
The above allows participation to occur on a leveled scale. Citizens at the end of 
the day know what they need and require. Though diverse ethnically and in terms 
of religion it is up to them to determine as mentioned above the nature of their 
similarities and differences. Citizens have a huge task ahead of determining 
where loyalties lie in terms of achieving progress democratically. This means 
being able to resist incentives for voting a particular way or inciting violence. This 
also means taking a stance against electoral violence. 
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4.3 Role of External Mediators in maintaining democracy 
In the wake of an election crisis in Kenya mediation proved to be very purposeful 
in preventing the violence.  Many politicians in Kenya were reluctant to see 
external actors in their domestic space. According to Foumunyoh (2009:13) there 
is a growing realization that investment of time and human resources in 
mediation can avert conflict and a further deterioration of the overall political and 
economic wellbeing of a country. For example he says Kenya and Ghana 
experienced competition and close elections within a one year interval and 
present instructive case studies on the roles of both domestic and international 
actors. While the 2008 elections were peaceful in Ghana, the 2007 elections 
turned violent in Kenya. The difference between these two examples is that 
Ghana showed the possibilities of mediation internally to prevent increase in 
tensions and the failure of such prevention mediation in Kenya. Kenya was able 
to respond to international mediation. 
 
According to Carment and James (2000:175) political leaders respond to 
international opportunities to promote their domestic interests, most explicitly the 
security and power of the ruling party elite. Leaders will use violence if it can 
secure or increase their share of power. This was certainly not the case in Kenya. 
Founmunyoh (2009:13) says in some cases it is difficult for domestic actors to 
intervene and resolve conflict because internal actors might drive their own 
interests and agenda.   
 
Mediators in Kenya were brought in after the post election 2007 headed by 
Former secretary general Kofi Annan. According to Maathai (20 February 2008) 
other mediators included Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Tanzania’s Benjamin 
Mkapa and the Chairman of the AU President John Kufuor of Ghana.  These 
international and regional actors put pressure of the government to reform as well 
as helped avoid further violence. She further says that Kenyan politicians claimed 
that the representatives of the international community were meddling in the 
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internal affairs of the country. Mathaai( 20 February 2008) says “it may be the 
nature of the politicians to trivialise the suffering of their own people and play 
politics with the lives of those they purport to lead but this is the 21st century and 
the international community will not sit back and watch this happen”. 
 
After the power sharing deal the Kenyan government was slow to reform 
electorally and constitutionally.  Okerafor (2009) says in response to what some 
are labeling reluctance of the unity government to proceed with reform the 
international community has decided to put on the pressure. For Instance the 
Hague-based ICC (international Criminal Court) reacted to the governments’ 
failure or unwillingness to set up an indigenous tribunal for those who committed 
and orchestrated the post violence. The ICC has promised to pursue the alledged 
perpetrators on its own. 
 
He further says the US government had written to some 15 senior unidentified 
Kenyan political figures and warned them that if they do not take the reform 
seriously they will suffer consequences including travel bans and targeted 
financial sanctions. The US is concerned that if no real progress is made towards 
reform, the likelihood of another major crisis erupting in 2012 will be high.  
Mathaai (20 February 2008) says the mediators had to pressure the political 
leadership to appeal to their supporters to stop the violence and give dialogue a 
chance. The international community was putting pressure on Kenya partly 
because that is what is expected of the international community. It is a moral 
responsibility to intervene when life and human rights are threatened. 
 
The Voice of America News (09 November 2009) says Kenyan minister Justice 
Mutula Kilonzo says if the US is interested in bringing reform President Barack 
Obama should give Kenya necessary financial aid to modernize the country’s 
electoral system. The Minister said if Kenya fails to come up with a new electoral 
system the 2007 post election violence would be a picnic.  This evidence shows 
that the international and regional mediators have been instrumental in promoting 
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democracy. They have also been instrumental in making sure that the 
perpetrators of the post electoral violence are brought to book so that 
constitutional reform is achieved and human rights are upheld. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
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What this chapter has shown is that Kenya has a history of repressive 
government administrations. The post colonial structures still continues today.  
Kenya has a history of repression and ethnic issues that still exist today as well. 
The post-electoral violence of 2007 has left the citizens of Kenya more apathetic 
due to an electoral system that has failed to produce sustainable democracy. 
 
 
 The violence in Kenya has shown that democratization does not come easy and 
in many times authoritative governments have prevented the change to 
democracy. It ha also shown that in most cases violence is incited from the top 
down to the people due to various reasons. One of the main reasons is staying in 
power. As stated electoral violence can be used a tool for staying power. 
 
The role that citizens had is a double-edged sword some of them causing the 
violence and others violently attacked. A democracy can never be practiced fully 
if the rights of the citizens are not met and they are not offered the protection that 
they deserve and many of them were killed and displaced. The external 
mediators achieved a lot through a power sharing agreement which served to 
keep the peace and their pressure on government forces government to listen 
and acknowledge the rights of the people. 
 
Electoral violence can never be a solution to hearing the voices of different 
actors, it can never be a sustainable solution to be used by incumbents and 
challengers to state their positions as it far worse effects on the political climate 
of the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 79 
Chapter 5 
 
5. How fair are fair elections: electoral violence in Zimbabwe 
 
“Our bloody elections are part of the tribute we pay for making a fetish of something we could 
have thrown away. Such a pattern of repetitive violence cannot be dismissed as merely 
circumstantial. The problem is systemic, systemic problems cannot be solved through 
improvisation. They require solutions that go back to institutional causes” 
Ayi Kwei Armah, 2009 
 
Since independence, the political landscape in Zimbabwe has been in transition 
towards democracy. Zimbabwe intended to have a healthy economy, the 
education levels in the country were on a much higher scale than the rest of the 
continent.  It was often described as the bread basket of Southern Africa. 
Zimbabwe also held regular elections and domestically and internationally 
remained acclaimed as a progressive African country. 
 
The problem with Zimbabwe as with many other countries arose with the issue of 
transfering power. For many decades the country has known one president and  
problems over who is benefiting from the country’s wealth will arise.  According to 
Ajayeoba (2009:4) in Kenya and Zimbabwe, the incumbent running for re-election 
could face humiliation if he is defeated. This means that if Mugabe’s party is 
defeated by the MDC this would humiliate ZANU PF. These are incumbents with 
direct and personal stakes in the election and its outcome. ZANU- PF which is 
the ruling party has been known to use violence as a way of staying in power. 
Similarly Straus and Taylor (2009:8) say that incumbents more often than not 
employ violence to maintain power. 
 
The chapter aims to discuss  electoral violence in Zimbabwe from the main 
actors to reasons why electoral violence occurs, discuss the roles of citizens and 
external actors in maintaining democracy. This chapter will focus on the 2008 
elections similar to Kenya there was more international concern and focus 
considering Zimbabwe’s continuous decline politically and democratically 
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5.1 Issues of electoral violence in Zimbabwe 
 
The elections of December 2008 increased the crisis that has been going on in 
Zimbabwe since 2000.  According to Pigou (2008:3) the violence that has 
prevailed in Zimbabwe since 2000 has a qualitatively different character to 
previous periods in that it is related both to elections and maintenance of political 
power through the ballot box by ZANU- PF. He says until the March 2008 
elections, the employment of violence and intimidation by state security and 
intelligence agencies with the assistance of other surrogates and proxies  
enabled ZANU-PF to retain power through the ballot. This is the regrettable 
history that Zimbabwe has, as a country with a history of conflict the ruling party 
has continued with this technique to achieve its way. Kriger (2005:2) says 
organized violence and intimidation of the opposition albeit of varying intensity 
has been a recurrent strategy of the ruling party before, during and often after 
elections to punish constituencies that dared oppose it. 
 
This is how the post-election violence of March 2008 ensued; ZANU PF could not 
accept defeat.Mugabe expected his party to win.  In speeches prior to the March 
29 poll, Mugabe made it clear that he regarded the elections as simply an 
opportunity to show fealty and obeisance to power, and then reap promised and 
consequent rewards. A vote for anyone other than the ruling party’s candidates 
would be a “wasted” vote. Mugabe also stated on numerous occasions that 
power would “never, ever” be yielded to the MDC and Morgan Tsvangarai. 
Presidential candidate Morgan Tsvangarai garnered 47.9 percent of the 
approximate 2 500 000 votes cast against Mugabe’s 43.2 a convincing win but it 
did not prevent a run off between these two front runners of four candidates. 
Matyzak (2008:2)  
 
The statement that Mugabe made was true indeed these elections were not a 
handing over of power but some sort of statement which was announcing where 
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power will always reside. As stated, electoral violence can be used to maintain 
power. 
 
According to Badza (2008:9) the actual first round voting day was peaceful and 
calm. Most polling stations opened and closed as scheduled. Most voters 
managed to cast their ballots as the queues were relatively short. The police 
assisted those who needed help. However some voters were turned away for a 
number of reasons that suggested a poor voter education campaign, one that 
had been handled exclusively by the ZEC. There were isolated reports of 
electoral violence. He (2008:10) further states that the opposition claimed that 
more than 50 of its supporters had been killed and over 40 000 people had been 
displaced. ZANU PF on their part claimed that its militants were targets of 
political violence which it held the MDC-T responsible. After the harmonized 
elections the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights reported that 
they had treated more than 200 victims of political violence. The battle lines were 
drawn a long time ago no one but ZANU PF was supposed to win these elections 
and clearly there was a lot of intimidation involved for supporters of the 
opposition. 
 
Matyzak (2008:36) says the violence was believed to be coordinated by the Joint 
Operations Command which consists of chiefs, Mugabe and close advisors. The 
purpose of the violence was to intimidate and discourage people from voting for 
the MDC, prevent them from doing so by displacement and confiscation of 
essential National Identity Cards and to prevent MDC campaigning through the 
beating, abduction of MDC activists and officials. The violence was intended to 
be a display to the electorate of ZANU PF’s power and that such power has been 
retained regardless of the result of the 29 March poll. Referring to the 1990 
elections, Kriger (2005:19) says post election violence was present against the 
opposition. She says post- election violence against the opposition reflects badly 
on the capacity of a party’s leadership to promote a civic political culture, the 
leaders were imposing a different political culture. 
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The major cause of electoral violence in Zimbabwe has been the ruling party 
ZANU-PF. It is clear to most that this party wants to remain in power. At some 
point according to Kriger (2005:22) senior party leaders, including President 
Mugabe used rhetoric at party campaign rallies to instill fear and anxiety in 
potential opponents. Mugabe emphasized the importance of unity and asserted 
that political parties brought conflict, quarrels and instability all of which had no 
place in Zimbabwe. According to Zounmenou (2009) the causes of electoral 
violence in Zimbabwe are slightly different than to those of Kenya. The lack of 
independence of the ZEC, the use of political power to disenfranchise opponents 
and selective use of law. Furthermore political repression, arbitrary creation of 
districts and constituencies, labeling of opponents and under funding of the 
electoral process hence diminished capacity to police it. 
 
One of the solutions that can be presented forth for Zimbabwe at this point is to 
have fresh elections which will ensure a change of government is. Mugabe has 
been president of the nations since independence in 1980 and this cannot be 
healthy for a democracy. According to Armah (2009:32) the problem with state 
that experience electoral violence is systemic. He says systemic problems cannot 
be solved through improvisation. Where malfunctions are so serious as to cause 
regular massacres, it is the entire system that is ripe for replacement not just 
some defective part. 
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5.2 Role of Civilians in the electoral violence 
 
It is rather unfortunate that the role of civilians in electoral violence does not 
change much whether it is Kenya or Zimbabwe. The role of citizens in this regard 
is still a double edged sword you have those from the ruling side who are 
mandated at a party level to cause violence and commotion and you have those 
from the opposition who receive the violence and are ultimately forced to 
retaliate. These citizens at some point will receive a reward or incentive for this 
act of goodness on the party’s behalf. 
 
One could say that it is apparent from the results of the 29th March poll that 
Zimbabweans in their majority wanted change. They wanted presidential 
candidate Morgan Tsvangarai to be president of Zimbabwe so that the country 
could be ushered into a new era. The number of people that voted across the 
years continues to rise. According to Pigou (2008:3) these human rights 
documentation show that levels of violence have been increasingly marked over 
the past three years with 2007 the worst year for human rights violations since 
2000. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO forum for example reported nearly 
9000 violations is 2007 as opposed to nearly 6000 in 2006. He says it appears 
that as Zimbabwe edges closer to political transition and the inevitable loss of 
power for ZANU-PF the levels of violence and intensity increase.  
 
With this loss of power comes the unleashing of a wrath upon citizens. Police and 
security apparatus cease to protect citizens. The citizenry lives in fear and 
becomes silent for they cannot choose any other party. They face violence and 
further intimidation. As stated the before the only solution for Zimbabwe remains 
a total change of government and perhaps citizens’ will gain a voice. At the 
moment citizens are apathetic towards this change and they have grown weary. 
 
 The problem that affects citizens is the fact that they are not given enough 
information about the issues at hand and they are not given a chance or space 
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for their voices to come through. According to Sisk (2008:3) when citizens are 
provided a direct voice in political life; society’s trust of willingness to cooperate 
with the state in achieving development is strengthened. As such electoral 
processes are very much about the peaceful management of social conflict 
through public dialogue, vigorous debate and authoritative selection of leaders 
through electoral values. That is a good electoral process will allow society on its 
own to determine the nature of its similarities and differences. 
 
As stated in chapter 3, there are various corrections that the government of 
Zimbabwe can do for their citizens. This is after a regime change and 
constitutional reform. The UNDP report (2002:9) suggests a number of things as 
well. Firstly it says governments must include non-state actors in development 
initiatives as a potential source of enhancing ownership and participatory 
governance. Secondly the institutional framework for effective engagement 
requires access to relevant information. Thirdly expanding the participatory 
process to include marginalized groups can multiply their capacity to improve 
their own welfare. Fourthly capacity building for engagement can help citizens 
play an informed role in policy decisions and create political space. Lastly civic 
oversight is a reservoir of political, economic, cultural and moral resources to 
check the accountability and transparency of state institutions. 
 
 
There is more possibility for change in Kenya for the citizens than for Zimbabwe 
as it stands.This is due to the fact that the coalition agreement in Kenya has been 
met and adhered to by all parties concerned. One hopes that the efforts of 
Morgan Tsvangarai to bring democracy come to pass. The consequence of this 
not happening will cause Zimbabwe into further down spiral.   
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5.3 Role of External Mediators in maintaining democracy 
 
The government of Zimbabwe has never taken kindly to external actors; even 
electoral observers have never been welcomed. President Robert Mugabe has 
been known to call international actors imperialists who want to decolonize 
Africa. According to Founmunyoh (2009:14) despite new norms and standards of 
democratic governance adopted by regional bodies such as the AU with its 
charter and the New partnership for African Development(NEPAD) and the 
African peer review mechanism(APRM), the Economic Community of West 
African States(ECOWAS) and the SADC, in countries such as Zimbabwe reject 
regional or international regimes. 
 
The only solution why Mugabe engages in mediation talks was due to the fact 
that he wanted sanctions imposed by the international community to be removed. 
According to Carment and James (2000:175) political leaders respond to 
international opportunities to promote their domestic interests, most explicitly the 
security and power of the ruling party elite. However Zimbabwe agreed to the 
SADC as a regional actor to intervene. It becomes hard to effectively change a 
situation where a country pleads sovereignty half the time. 
 
SADC had two mediation processes in Zimbabwe one before the 2008 elections 
and one after the elections in 2008. IDASA (2008:1) publicly proclaimed that the 
objective of the SADC-mandated mediation was to create the political conditions 
for holding of free and fair elections in Zimbabwe. The negotiations led to a series 
of changes to the constitutions, the electoral laws, the laws regulating freedom of 
assembly and the operation of the print and electronic media. The ruling party 
and the main opposition party agreed to these changes to the law. 
 
IDASA says (2008:2) at the end of March 2007, the SADC gave former South 
African president Mbeki a mandate to facilitate negotiations between 
Zimbabwean government and the opposition MDC. The declared intention was 
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that these negotiations would result in such changes to the electoral and political 
terrain as were necessary to ensure elections held in 2008 could be considered 
by all free and fair. As noted from the way the 2008 elections went the above 
objectives were not achieved. 
 
Badza (2008:10) argues that SADC has been actively involved in the 
Zimbabwean situation. He also says it may be held partly responsible for the post 
election situation that is prevailing in Zimbabwe. In response to what turned out 
to be an election crisis, the late Zambian president Levy Mwanawasa, as SADC 
chairperson convened an extraordinary summit meeting of heads of states and 
government on 12 April 2008 to consider the Zimbabwean issue. Mbeki and 
Mugabe did not see this summit as necessary and this showed the cracks and 
differences regarding the Zimbabwean issue in the regional body. Badza says 
the SADC insistence on quiet diplomacy is largely based on the perceived fear of 
political destabilization and the threat of war by spoilers, as well as distorted 
notions of Pan African solidarity was a traditional non-coercive approach to 
conflict. This approach of seeking some change without a regime change is 
premised on SADC’s various state-centered protocols and treaties and especially 
articles 7 and 8 of the SADC mutual defence pact (2003) which stipulates the 
principles of sovereignty and non-interference. 
 
This approach did not work and South Africa also tried quiet diplomacy as a 
technique. Eventually through more negotiations Mbeki was able to broker a 
power sharing deal between the MDC and the ruling party. This Global Political 
agreement (GPA) has not produced any real changes. According to the CNN (12 
December 2009) Mugabe has said that the fragile power sharing government in 
his country was given a short life and he intents to reclaim control through new 
elections. 
 
Wafawarova (2009) says the GPA is from suffering self-serving manipulation by 
politicians whose motivation is far from matters of good or effective governance, 
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it is diligently seeking to amass as much power as their greedy quest can allow. 
This shows that as much effort as can be put into Zimbabwe, the ruling party is 
not will to accept a time for change and a time putting things back into place 
nothing external actors try will succeed.  Wafawarova (2009) says the idealistic 
side of the GPA is that politicians from all three parties in the inclusive 
government would come together for the good of the nation and that 
compromises that are in the interest of the nation should be made without any 
hesitation. 
 
Perhaps scholars who were against the power sharing agreement are correct in 
saying that the peace it brings will be short lived. According to Armah (2009:33-
34) power sharing without addressing the issue of resource scarcity, without 
expanding the local economy by developing value added industries and jobs, 
proposes to allocate the small percentage of local wealth to the ruling elite, not to 
one strong party but to two or three. Instead of 20 ministers, power-sharing 
proposes 40. Instead of one president, power sharing proposes a president and 
two or more vice-presidents. Armah says if we multiply this formula by 5, 10, 15 
times we are staring at boundless chaos.Years down the line power sharing will 
cause such as waste of public funds that politicians will descend to wrestling over 
steadily decreasing piles of loot. Power sharing is a bugle call to greater electoral 
disasters for tomorrow. 
 
 
 No one knows when change is going to befall Zimbabwe but it certainly will not 
have much of a choice if it wants grow the country’s economy again. 
The situation may have not been altered completely by external actors but the 
unity government has succeeded in opening debate about democracy in 
Zimbabwe. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
The chapter has highlighted a number of issues about post-electoral violence in 
Zimbabwe. Firstly it has shown that electoral violence has been a technique the 
ruling party has deployed for a number of elections in order to retain power. 
Secondly it highlighted the fact that citizens in Zimbabwe do not have much voice 
or choice to begin with. Living under an oppressive government makes them 
prone to unscrupulous decisions. 
 
Thirdly what the chapter has highlighted is the fact that regime change cannot be 
envisioned unless the ruling party wishes to transfer the power. Fourthly external 
mediators either improve the situation or make it worse. Zimbabwe is not friendly 
to international actors so it opted for regional actors which may have helped the 
situation in the end but did a lot of damage along the way. 
 
Just like the Kenyan case this chapter has shown that even for whatever reason 
electoral violence may be thought of as a useful technique; it worsens the 
country’s political and economic climate. It also deligitimises the incumbent 
government and what they stand for both domestically and internationally. The 
likelihood of a change in Zimbabwe is very slim. 
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Chapter 6 
 
6. Conclusion and recommendations 
 
In concluding this research report, it is necessary to reflect on the research 
questions posed in this study. 
 
The study looked at three main questions, the first reflected on democracy in 
Kenya and Zimbabwe, highlighting the challenges of democratization. The 
second question spoke to elections in Africa, particularly electoral violence in 
both mentioned countries. The third element talked about refers to external 
actors and the role they played in maintaining democracy. 
 
 Chapter two and three largely revealed that democracy is not an easy system. 
When looking at the democratization process in Africa one could say that it was 
marred by certain impediments. Firstly the study could not divorce the issue of 
the post- colonial state as an impediment. In many African countries including 
Kenya and Zimbabwe colonial structures still exist. Secondly, in many instances 
scholars struggle to define what democracy is supposed to mean. Most times 
democracy has been looked at in a western eye and is supposed to be the viable 
choice in Africa due to the fact that it worked for most western countries. It is 
important to note that even long standing democracies face problems.  
 
Perhaps the recommendation here is for African head of states and African 
academics to have a discussion on what democracy is and institute a dialogue of 
learning from each other and other developing places that have achieved 
democracy. 
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Overall, this does not mean that the problem goes away in emerging 
democracies especially for those in Africa. The third obstacle is that democracy 
reflects a crisis in the African state itself, according to Clapham (1993:423). He 
says the obstacles in Africa lie as they have always in the absence or inadequacy 
of the social, political and economic conditions that help foster  the sense of 
identity which is turn needed to make such accountability possible and thus to 
institutionalise democratic methods as a regular and respectful way of organizing 
political life.  This is also due to that notion that the African state as we know it is 
an imported idea that has not been kept up they way it ought to. 
 
There are certain aspects that are vital in making a democracy work effectively. 
The first recommendation would be to involve citizens because democracy 
cannot exist nor be exercised without them. One cannot really pin point how true 
the participation of citizens was in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Secondly in order for 
democracy to be legitimised it needs to guarantee its citizens all fundamental 
rights and civil liberties. At some point of the many transitions that both countries 
have had to go through, civil liberties have been assets that fell prey to the 
system. Thirdly a country that is declared democratic is transparent, accountable 
and responsible to the wide nation it serves. Lastly one could say that democracy 
needs to have solid institutions as well as independence institutions.  Kenya and 
Zimbabwe represented political systems where there was no distinction between 
leader, political party and government and hence the governments’ coffers could 
be the presidents’ riches and the political party’s resource pool. 
 
 Chapters four and five showed that elections are processes not events that need 
to be monitored even before the polling day. There is a relationship between 
elections and democracy that exists. Democracy means that the people can have 
the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men that want to rule. This is a part of 
the civil liberties mentioned above; citizens should have the right to choose 
according to what they perceive their needs to be.  Most importantly countries 
such as Zimbabwe and Kenya are judged harshly during election periods. 
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Elections are used to symbolize how democratic a country is. A country that 
holds free and fair elections is a democratic country.  Even though this might be 
the case one needs not be naïve in thinking that elections, whether free or not 
symbolize democracy. Many elections have been known to be conducted for 
show without real meaning to them. For example, many had their hopes pinned 
on the 2008 presidential elections in Zimbabwe. Again many assumed that the 
time for regime change had come in Zimbabwe especially when the election 
results announced Morgan Tsvangarai of the MDC as the winner. The possibility 
of the MDC winning the election was slim as the ruling party had already decided 
that power will never be given to the MDC. Indeed this came to pass hence the 
elections were just for show. 
 
Zimbabwe and Kenya have had similar ailments when it comes to elections. 
Firstly elections have often been started on unequal footing. The incumbent 
governments have always carried more power and access than challengers. 
Secondly, in regard to opposition the governments of Kenya and Zimbabwe have 
been reluctant in accepting opposition parties as necessary tools of democracy. 
They were reluctant in accepting multi-party elections and preferred one party 
state system. Zimbabwe to some extent still prefers the one party state system. 
Thirdly both countries experience a vast level of electoral violence in their 
elections. The causes of this violence have been similar in some instances such 
as the lack of independence of their electoral commission. The difference has 
been that much of Kenya has been marred by the ethnic element which has been 
driven by both the opposition and the incumbent government.  
 
However it seems that both countries have a history of violence. ZANU PF has 
mandated young militias to intimidate opposition supporters and the opposition 
itself has been forced to retaliate against violence. Kenya also has a history of 
electoral violence. Electoral violence can be traced back to the 1990s. When 
multi-party politics were reintroduced in December 1991 politicians in the then 
dominant KANU party whipped up ethnic hatred and displaced and 
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disenfranchised members of rival communities as a means of holding on to 
power. 
 
The recommendations in relation to elections are; as mentioned before elections 
must be treated as process instead of an event that passes over a number of 
days. Secondly proper voter education is necessary so that citizens are aware of 
party positions and policies. Thirdly moving forward there is a need in both 
countries to thoroughly investigate the true causes of electoral violence. Both 
governments need to try and capture the voices of their people meaning trying to 
find out what the citizens need and want. Hold healthy debates so that 
democratic processes prevail. 
 
The question of external actors coming in is a difficult one, which seems to have 
many sides to it. Firstly countries can always plead sovereignty according to 
international and regional laws. Zimbabwe has been known to be a country that 
doesn’t accept international help easily due to its relationship with Britain. 
Secondly external help can mean the difference between getting the help a 
country needs and worsening the situation. Kenya and Ghana experienced 
competition and close elections within a one year interval and present instructive 
case studies on the roles of both domestic and international actors. While the 
2008 elections were peaceful in Ghana, the 2007 elections turned violent in 
Kenya. The difference of these two examples is that Ghana showed the 
possibilities of mediation internally to prevent increase in tensions and the failure 
of such prevention mediation in Kenya. Kenya was able to respond to 
international mediation. Thirdly external actors may not know the local context 
and may assume a lot of situations, certain thing do not apply everywhere like 
power sharing for example. It may be carried from other contexts to the African 
contexts. 
However external actors have played an important role in both countries. They 
were able to consolidate the power base between two parties. They were also 
able to prevent further violence. They were also able to highlight certain issues 
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that each country needs to face and that is being able to transfer power and 
being able to have peaceful elections. 
 
Both countries have recently changed the face of what democracy is by opting for 
coalition governments.  The recommendation for both countries would be a 
serious adjustment of political will. Political will can be defined as the 
demonstrated credible intent of political actors. This is when there is commitment 
from leaders and bureaucrats to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives 
and to sustain the costs of those actions over time. Malena (2009:18). Perhaps 
the recommendation in Africa should be building of institutions so that power is 
decentralized. Perhaps ideally African elites will cede a bit to the citizens they are 
meant to represent. Then citizen participation will flourish, power will be 
decentralized, institutions will be strong ideally all checks and balances will be in 
place and then democracy will prevail. Perhaps people will simply learn to work 
together.  
 
 
 
Generally only time will tell whether both countries will be successful in their next 
attempts of democracy. Secondly whether there will be a significant power shift in 
Zimbabwe, not only in the country itself but whether ZANU PF has a person fit 
enough, radical enough to fit into Mugabe’s shoes that is if he doesn’t run for 
president again. At this point one would say no actor is surprised by the actions 
that Mugabe takes.  As for Kenya it will be interesting to see whether Mwai Kibaki 
allows Raila Odinga to have his chance at the presidency, after reneging from 
their 2002 agreement which forced Odinga to be the opposition. The 2007 
election also saw the presidency being snatched from Odinga’s hands and forced 
to share with Kibaki. 
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The issues of democracy, electoral violence and civil participation have shown 
that there are still many lessons to be learnt. Democracy is a system that needs 
to be revisited and scholars and academics need to hold more debates around 
this issue. Secondly citizens need to be engaged and they need to be involved in 
all processes. Thirdly Kenya and Zimbabwe owe a lot to external actors who 
assisted both countries in remaining peaceful after elections and plan a way 
forward through coalition governments. Fourthly electoral violence seems to be a 
symptom of deeper issues going on between the citizens and their respective 
governments. As mentioned before there is a need to consider the way elections 
will be conducted and handled before polling day. Both countries have managed 
to re-engage issues of democracy and that can be considered as a positive step. 
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8. Appendix 1: Zimbabwe Power Sharing Agreement 
 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION-
PATRIOTIC FRONT (ZANU-PF) AND THE TWO MOVEMENT FOR 
DEMOCRATIC CHANGE (MDC) FORMATIONS, ON RESOLVING THE 
CHALLENGES FACING ZIMBABWE 
 
 
PREAMBLE 
We, the Parties to this Agreement; 
 
CONCERNED about the recent challenges that we have faced as a country and 
the multiple threats to the well-being of our people and, therefore, determined to 
resolve these permanently. 
 
CONSIDERING our shared determination to uphold, defend and sustain 
Zimbabwe’s sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity, as 
a respected member of the international community, a nation where all citizens 
respect and, therefore, enjoy equal protection of the law and have equal 
opportunity to compete and prosper in all spheres of life. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGING the sacrifices made by thousands of Zimbabwe’s gallant 
sons and daughters in the fight against colonialism and racial discrimination and 
determined to accept, cherish and recognise the significance of the Liberation 
Struggle as the foundation of our sovereign independence, freedoms and human 
rights. 
 
DEDICATING ourselves to putting an end to the polarisation, divisions, conflict 
and intolerance that has characterised Zimbabwean politics and society in recent 
times. 
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COMMITTING ourselves to putting our people and our country first by arresting 
the fall in living standards and reversing the decline of our economy. 
 
 
EMPHASISING our shared commitment to re-orient our attitudes towards 
respect for the Constitution and all national laws, the rule of law, observance of 
Zimbabwe’s national institutions, symbols and national events. 
 
RESPECTING the rights of all Zimbabweans regardless of political affiliation to 
benefit from and participate in all national programmes and events freely without 
let or hindrance. 
 
RECOGNISING, accepting and acknowledging that the values of justice, 
fairness, openness, tolerance, equality, non-discrimination and respect of all 
persons without regard to race, class, gender, ethnicity, language, religion, 
political opinion, place of origin or birth are the bedrock of our democracy and 
good governance. 
 
DETERMINED to build a society free of violence, fear, intimidation, hatred, 
patronage, corruption and founded on justice, fairness, openness, transparency, 
dignity and equality. 
 
RECOGNISING and accepting that the Land Question has been at the core of 
the contestation in Zimbabwe and acknowledging the centrality of issues relating 
to the rule of law, respect for human rights, democracy and governance. 
 
COMMITTED to act in a manner that demonstrates loyalty to Zimbabwe, 
patriotism and commitment to Zimbabwe’s national purpose, core values, 
interests and aspirations. 
 
DETERMINED to act in a manner that demonstrates respect for the democratic 
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values of justice, fairness, openness, tolerance, equality, respect of all persons 
and human rights. 
 
SUBMITTING ourselves to the mandate of the Extraordinary Summit of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) held in Dar-es-Salaam, 
United Republic of Tanzania, on 29th March 2007 and endorsed in Lusaka on 
12th April 2008 and in the AU Summit held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt from 30th 
June to 1 July 2008. 
 
RECOGNISING the centrality and importance of African institutions in dealing 
with African problems, we agreed to seek solutions to our differences, challenges 
and problems through dialogue. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGING that pursuant to the Dar-es-Salaam SADC resolution, the 
Parties negotiated and agreed on a draft Constitution, initialed by the Parties on 
30 September 2007, and further agreed and co-sponsored the enactment of the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Number 18 Act, amendments to the 
Electoral Act, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act, Public Order and 
Security Act, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act and 
Broadcasting Services Act. 
 
APPRECIATING the historical obligation and need to reach a solution that will 
allow us to put Zimbabwe first and give the people a genuine chance of 
rebuilding and reconstructing their livelihoods. 
 
PURSUANT to the common desire of working together, the Parties agreed to 
and executed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21 July 2008, attached 
hereto as Annexure “A”. 
 
NOW THEREFORE AGREE AS FOLLOWS: 
ARTICLE I 
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DEFINITIONS 
 
1. Definitions 
The “Agreement” shall mean this written Agreement signed by the 
representatives of ZANU-PF and the MDC, in its two formations (“the Parties”) in 
fulfillment of the material mandate handed down by the SADC Extraordinary 
Summit on 29th March 2007 and endorsed by SADC in Lusaka, Zambia and 
adopted by the African Union Summit in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. 
The “Parties” shall mean ZANU-PF, the two MDC formations led by Morgan 
Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara respectively. The “Government” or “New 
Government” means the new Government to be set up in terms of this  
agreement. 
 
ARTICLE II 
DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT 
2. Declaration of Commitment 
The Parties hereby declare and agree to work together to create a genuine, 
viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the 
Zimbabwe situation and in particular to implement the following agreement with 
the aims of resolving once and for all the current political and economic situations 
and charting a new political direction for the country. 
 
ARTICLE III 
RESTORATION OF ECONOMIC STABILITY AND GROWTH 
3. Economic recovery 
3.1 The Parties agree: 
(a) to give priority to the restoration of economic stability and growth in 
Zimbabwe. The Government will lead the process of developing and 
implementing an economic recovery strategy and plan. To that end, the 
parties are committed to working together on a full and comprehensive 
economic programme to resuscitate Zimbabwe’s economy, which will 
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urgently address the issues of production, food security, poverty and 
unemployment and the challenges of high inflation, interest rates and the 
exchange rate. 
(b) to create conditions that would ensure that the 2008/2009 agricultural 
season is productive. 
(c) to establish a National Economic Council, composed of representatives of 
the Parties and of the following sectors: 
(i) Manufacturing 
(ii) Agriculture 
(iii) Mining 
(iv) Tourism 
(v) Commerce 
(vi) Financial 
(vii) Labour 
(viii) Academia; and 
(ix) Other relevant sectors 
(d) that the terms of reference of the Council shall include giving advice to 
Government, formulating economic plans and programmes for approval by 
government and such other functions as are assigned to the Council by 
the Government. 
(e) to endorse the SADC resolution on the economy. 
 
ARTICLE IV 
SANCTIONS AND MEASURES 
4. Sanctions and Measures 
4.1 Recognising and acknowledging that some sections of the international 
community have since 2000 imposed various sanctions and measures against 
Zimbabwe, which have included targeted sanctions. 
4.2 The Parties note the present economic and political isolation of Zimbabwe by 
the United Kingdom, European Union, United States of America and other 
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sections of the International Community over and around issues of disputed 
elections, governance and differences over the land reform programme. 
 
4.3 Noting and acknowledging the following sanctions and measures imposed on 
Zimbabwe:- 
(a) enactment of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act by 
the United States of America Congress which outlaws Zimbabwe’s right to 
access credit from International Financial Institutions in which the United 
States Government is represented or has a stake; 
(b) suspension of Zimbabwe’s voting and related rights, suspension of 
balance of payment support, declaration of ineligibility to borrow Fund 
resources and suspension of technical assistance to Zimbabwe by the 
International Monetary Fund; 
(c) suspension of grants and infrastructural development support to 
Zimbabwe by The World Bank; and 
(d) imposition of targeted travel bans against current Government and some 
business leaders. 
 
4.4 Noting that this international isolation has over the years created a negative 
international perception of Zimbabwe and thereby resulting in the further isolation 
of the country by the non-availing of lines of credit to Zimbabwe by some 
sections of the international community. 
 
4.5 Recognising the consequent contribution of this isolation to the further 
decline of the economy. 
 
4.6 Desirous and committed to bringing to an end the fall in the standards of 
living of our people, the Parties hereby agree:- 
(a) to endorse the SADC resolution on sanctions concerning Zimbabwe; 
(b) that all forms of measures and sanctions against Zimbabwe be lifted in 
order to facilitate a sustainable solution to the challenges that are currently 
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facing Zimbabwe; and 
(c) commit themselves to working together in re-engaging the international 
community with a view to bringing to an end the country’s international 
isolation. 
 
 
ARTICLE V 
LAND QUESTION 
5. Land Question 
5.1 Recognising that colonial racist land ownership patterns established during 
the colonial conquest of Zimbabwe and largely maintained in the post 
independence period were not only unsustainable, but against the national 
interest, equity and justice. 
 
 
5.2 Noting that in addition to the primary objective of the liberation struggle to 
winone man one vote democracy and justice, the land question, namely the need 
for the re-distribution of land to the majority indigenous people of Zimbabwe was 
at the core of the liberation struggle. 
 
5.3 Accepting the inevitability and desirability of a comprehensive land reform 
programme in Zimbabwe that redresses the issues of historical imbalances and 
injustices in order to address the issues of equity, productivity, and justice. 
 
5.4 While differing on the methodology of acquisition and redistribution the 
parties acknowledge that compulsory acquisition and redistribution of land has 
taken place under a land reform programme undertaken since 2000. 
 
5.5 Accepting the irreversibility of the said land acquisitions and redistribution. 
 
5.6 Noting that in the current Constitution of Zimbabwe and further in the Draft 
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Constitution agreed to by the parties the primary obligation of compensating 
former land owners for land acquired rests on the former colonial power. 
 
5.7 Further recognising the need to ensure that all land is used productively in 
theinterests of all the people of Zimbabwe. 
 
5.8 Recognising the need for women’s access and control over land in their own 
right as equal citizens. 
 
5.9 The Parties hereby agree to: 
(a) conduct a comprehensive, transparent and non-partisan land audit, during 
the tenure of the Seventh Parliament of Zimbabwe, for the purpose of 
establishing accountability and eliminating multiple farm ownerships. 
(b) ensure that all Zimbabweans who are eligible to be allocated land and 
who apply for it shall be considered for allocation of land irrespective of 
race, gender, religion, ethnicity or political affiliation; 
(c) ensure security of tenure to all land holders. 
(d) call upon the United Kingdom government to accept the primary 
responsibility to pay compensation for land acquired from former land 
owners for resettlement; 
(e) work together to secure international support and finance for the land 
reform programme in terms of compensation for the former land owners 
and support for new farmers; and 
(f) work together for the restoration of full productivity on all agricultural land. 
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ARTICLE VI 
CONSTITUTION 
6. Constitution 
Acknowledging that it is the fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean 
people to make a constitution by themselves and for themselves; 
Aware that the process of making this constitution must be owned and driven by 
the people and must be inclusive and democratic; 
Recognising that the current Constitution of Zimbabwe made at the Lancaster 
House Conference, London (1979) was primarily to transfer power from the 
colonial authority to the people of Zimbabwe; 
Acknowledging the draft Constitution that the Parties signed and agreed to in 
Kariba on the 30th of September 2007, annexed hereto as Annexure “B”; 
Determined to create conditions for our people to write a constitution for 
themselves; and 
Mindful of the need to ensure that the new Constitution deepens our democratic 
values and principles and the protection of the equality of all citizens, particularly 
the enhancement of full citizenship and equality of women. 
 
6.1 The Parties hereby agree: 
(a) that they shall set up a Select Committee of Parliament composed of 
representatives of the Parties whose terms of reference shall be as follows: 
(i) to set up such subcommittees chaired by a member of Parliament 
and composed of members of Parliament and representatives of Civil Society as 
may be necessary to assist the Select Committee in performing its mandate 
herein; 
(ii) to hold such public hearings and such consultations as it may deem 
necessary in the process of public consultation over the making of 
a new constitution for Zimbabwe; 
(iii) to convene an All Stakeholders Conference to consult stakeholders  on their 
representation in the sub-committees referred to above and  such related matters 
as may assist the committee in its work; 
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(iv) to table its draft Constitution to a 2nd All Stakeholders Conference; 
and 
(v) to report to Parliament on its recommendations over the content of a New 
Constitution for Zimbabwe 
(b) that the draft Constitution recommended by the Select Committee shall be 
submitted to a referendum; 
(c) that, in implementing the above, the following time frames shall apply: 
(i) the Select Committee shall be set up within two months of inception 
of a new government; 
(ii) the convening of the first All Stakeholders Conference shall be within 3 
months of the date of the appointment of the Select  Committee; 
(iii) the public consultation process shall be completed no later than 4 months of 
the date of the first All Stakeholders Conference; 
(iv) the draft Constitution shall be tabled within 3 months of completion of the 
public consultation process to a second All Stakeholders Conference; 
(v) the draft Constitution and the accompanying Report shall be tabled 
before Parliament within 1 month of the second All Stakeholders Conference; 
(vi) the draft Constitution and the accompanying Report shall be 
debated in Parliament and the debate concluded within one month; 
 (vii) the draft Constitution emerging from Parliament shall be gazetted before the 
holding of a referendum; 
(viii) a referendum on the new draft Constitution shall be held within 3 months of 
the conclusion of the debate; 
(ix) in the event of the draft Constitution being approved in the referendum it shall 
be gazetted within 1 month of the date of the referendum; and 
(x) the draft Constitution shall be introduced in Parliament no later than 1 month 
after the expiration of the period of 30 days from the date  of its gazetting. 
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ARTICLE VII 
PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION AND UNITY 
7. Equality, National Healing, Cohesion and Unity 
7.1 The Parties hereby agree that the new Government: 
a) will ensure equal treatment of all regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, place 
of origin and will work towards equal access to development for all; 
b) will ensure equal and fair development of all regions of the country and in 
particular to correct historical imbalances in the development of regions; 
c) shall give consideration to the setting up of a mechanism to properly advise 
on what measures might be necessary and practicable to achieve national 
healing, cohesion and unity in respect of victims of pre and post independence 
political conflicts; and 
d) will strive to create an environment of tolerance and respect among 
Zimbabweans and that all citizens are treated with dignity and decency 
irrespective of age, gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin or political 
affiliation. 
e) will formulate policies and put measures in place to attract the return and 
repatriation of all Zimbabweans in the Diaspora and in particular will work 
towards the return of all skilled personnel. 
 
ARTICLE VIII 
RESPECT FOR NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND EVENTS 
8. Respect for National Institutions and Events 
8.1 In the interests of forging a common vision for our country, the Parties hereby 
agree:- 
(a) on the necessity of all Zimbabweans regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, 
political affiliation and religion to respect and observe Zimbabwe’s national 
institutions, symbols, national programmes and events; and 
(b) that all Zimbabweans regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, political 
affiliation and religion have the right to benefit from and participate in all 
national programmes and events without let or hindrance. 
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ARTICLE IX 
EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE 
9. External Interference 
9.1 The Parties reaffirm the principle of the United Nations Charter on 
noninterference in the internal affairs of member countries. 
9.2 The Parties hereby agree:- 
(a) that the responsibility of effecting change of government in Zimbabwe 
vests exclusively on and is the sole prerogative of the people of Zimbabwe 
through peaceful, democratic and constitutional means; 
(b) to reject any unlawful, violent, undemocratic and unconstitutional means of 
changing governments; and 
(c) that no outsiders have a right to call or campaign for regime change in 
Zimbabwe. 
13 
ARTICLE X 
FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
10. Free political activity 
Recognising that the right to canvass and freely mobilise for political support is 
the cornerstone of any multi-party democratic system, the Parties have agreed 
that there should be free political activity throughout Zimbabwe within the ambit 
of the law in which all political parties are able to propagate their views and 
canvass for support, free of harassment and intimidation. 
 
ARTICLE XI 
RULE OF LAW, RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER LAWS 
11. Rule of law, respect for the Constitution and other laws 
11.1 The Parties hereby agree that it is the duty of all political parties and 
individuals 
to: 
(a) respect and uphold the Constitution and other laws of the land; 
(b) adhere to the principles of the Rule of Law. 
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ARTICLE XII 
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 
12. Freedoms of Assembly and Association 
12.1 Recognising the importance of the freedoms of assembly and association in 
amulti-party democracy and noting that public meetings have to be conducted in 
a free, peaceful and democratic manner in accordance with the law, the Parties 
have agreed:- 
(a) to work together in a manner which guarantees the full implementation 
and realisation of the right to freedom of association and assembly; and 
(b) that the Government shall undertake training programmes, workshops and 
meetings for the police and other enforcement agencies directed at the 
appreciation of the right of freedom of assembly and association and the proper 
interpretation, understanding and application of the provisions of security 
legislation. 
ARTICLE XIII 
STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS 
13. State organs and institutions 
13.1 State organs and institutions do not belong to any political party and should 
be impartial in the discharge of their duties. 
13.2 For the purposes of ensuring that all state organs and institutions perform 
their duties ethically and professionally in conformity with the principles and 
requirements of a multi-party democratic system in which all parties are treated 
equally, the Parties have agreed that the following steps be taken:- 
(a) that there be inclusion in the training curriculum of members of the 
uniformed forces of the subjects on human rights, international 
humanitarian law and statute law so that there is greater understanding 
and full appreciation of their roles and duties in a multi-party democratic 
system; 
(b) ensuring that all state organs and institutions strictly observe the principles 
of the Rule of Law and remain non-partisan and impartial; 
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(c) laws and regulations governing state organs and institutions are strictly 
adhered to and those violating them be penalised without fear or favour; 
and 
(d) recruitment policies and practices be conducted in a manner that ensures 
that no political or other form of favouritism is practised. 
 
ARTICLE XIV 
TRADITIONAL LEADERS 
14. Traditional Leaders 
14.1 Recognising and acknowledging that traditional leaders are community 
leaders with equal responsibilities and obligations to all members of their 
communities regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, race, religion and political 
affiliation, the Parties hereby agree to:- 
15 
(a) commit themselves to ensuring the political neutrality of traditional leaders; 
and 
(b) call upon traditional leaders not to engage in partisan political activities at 
national level as well as in their communities. 
ARTICLE XV 
NATIONAL YOUTH TRAINING PROGRAMME 
15. National Youth Training Programme 
Recognising the desirability of a national youth training programme which 
inculcates the values of patriotism, discipline, tolerance, non-violence, openness, 
democracy, equality, justice and respect. 
Determined to ensure that the National Youth Training Programme raises 
awareness of the HIV and AIDS pandemic, engenders a spirit of community 
service, skills development and a commitment to the development of Zimbabwe 
15.1 The Parties hereby agree that:- 
(a) all youths regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, religion and political 
affiliation are eligible to participate in national youth training programmes; 
(b) the National Youth Training Programme must be run in a non-partisan 
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manner and shall not include partisan political material advancing the 
cause of any political party; and 
(c) while recognising that youths undergoing training at national youth 
training centres have a right to hold political opinions, they shall not, 
during the period of their training, collectively and as part of a scheme of 
the training centre be used or deployed for partisan political work. 
16 
ARTICLE XVI 
HUMANITARIAN AND FOOD ASSISTANCE 
16. Humanitarian and food assistance 
16.1 In times of need, every Zimbabwean regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, 
political affiliation and religion is entitled to request and receive humanitarian and 
food assistance from the State. 
16.2 It is the primary responsibility of the State to ensure that every Zimbabwean 
who needs humanitarian and food assistance receives it. 
16.3 Non-Governmental Organisations involved in giving humanitarian and food 
assistance shall do so without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, 
gender, political affiliation and religion and in doing so, shall not promote or 
advance the interests of any political party or cause. 
16.4 In this regard the Parties hereby agree: 
(a) that in the fulfillment of its obligations above, the Government and all State 
Institutions and quasi State Institutions shall render humanitarian and food 
assistance without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, 
gender, political affiliation or religion; 
(b) that humanitarian interventions rendered by Non-Governmental 
Organisations, shall be provided without discrimination on the grounds of 
race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion. 
(c) that all displaced persons shall be entitled to humanitarian and food 
assistance to enable them to return and settle in their original homes and 
that social welfare organisations shall be allowed to render such 
assistance as might be required. 
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(d) that all NGO`s rendering humanitarian and food assistance must operate 
within the confines of the laws of Zimbabwe. 
ARTICLE XVII 
LEGISLATIVE AGENDA PRIORITIES 
17. Legislative agenda 
17.1 The Parties hereby agree that: 
(a) the legislative agenda will be prioritized in order to reflect the letter and 
spirit of this agreement; 
(b) the Government will discuss and agree on further legislative measures 
which may become necessary to implement the Government’s agreed 
policies and in particular, with a view to entrenching democratic values 
and practices. 
ARTICLE XVIII 
SECURITY OF PERSONS AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 
18. Security of persons and prevention of violence 
18.1 Noting the easy resort to violence by political parties, State actors, Non-
State actors and others in order to resolve political differences and achieve 
political ends. 
18.2 Gravely concerned by the displacement of scores of people after the 
election of March 29, 2008 as a result of politically motivated violence. 
18.3 Recognising that violence dehumanises and engenders feelings of hatred 
and polarisation within the country. 
18.4 Further recognising that violence undermines our collective independence 
as a people and our capacity to exercise our free will in making political choices. 
18.5 The Parties hereby agree: 
(a) to promote the values and practices of tolerance, respect, non-violence 
and dialogue as means of resolving political differences; 
 (b) to renounce and desist from the promotion and use of violence, under 
whatever name called, as a means of attaining political ends; 
(c) that the Government shall apply the laws of the country fully and impartially in 
bringing all perpetrators of politically motivated violence to  book; 
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(d) that all political parties, other organisations and their leaders shall commit 
themselves to do everything to stop and prevent all forms of political  violence, 
including by non-State actors and shall consistently appeal to their members to 
desist from violence; 
(e) to take all measures necessary to ensure that the structures and institutions 
they control are not engaged in the perpetration of violence. 
(f) that all civil society organisations of whatever description whether affiliated to 
a political party or not shall not promote or advocate for or use violence or any 
other form of intimidation or coercion to canvass or mobilise for or  oppose any 
political party or to achieve any political end; 
(g) to work together to ensure the security of all persons and property; 
(h) to work together to ensure the safety of any displaced persons, their safe 
return home and their enjoyment of the full protection of the law. 
(i) to refrain from using abusive language that may incite hostility, political 
intolerance and ethnic hatred or unfairly undermine each other. 
(j) that while having due regard to the Constitution of Zimbabwe and the 
principles of the rule of law, the prosecuting authorities will expedite the 
determination as to whether or not there is sufficient evidence to warrant 
the prosecution or keeping on remand of all persons accused of politically 
related offences arising out of or connected with the March and June 2008 
elections. 
 
ARTICLE XIX 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND COMMUNICATION 
19. Freedom of Expression and Communication 
Recognising the importance of the right to freedom of expression and the role of 
the media in a multi-party democracy. 
Noting that while the provisions of the Broadcasting Services Act permit the 
issuance of licences, no licences other than to the public broadcaster have been 
issued. 
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Aware of the emergence of foreign based radio stations broadcasting into 
Zimbabwe, some of which are funded by foreign governments. 
Concerned that the failure to issue licences under the Broadcasting Services Act 
toalternative broadcasters might have given rise to external radio stations 
broadcasting into Zimbabwe. 
Further concerned that foreign government funded external radio stations 
broadcasting into Zimbabwe are not in Zimbabwe’s national interest. 
Desirous of ensuring the opening up of the air waves and ensuring the operation 
of as many media houses as possible. 
19.1 The Parties hereby agree:- 
(a) that the government shall ensure the immediate processing by the 
appropriate authorities of all applications for re-registration and registration 
in terms of both the Broadcasting Services Act as well as the Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act; 
(b) all Zimbabwean nationals including those currently working for or running 
external radio stations be encouraged to make applications for 
broadcasting licences, in Zimbabwe, in terms of the law; 
(c) that in recognition of the open media environment anticipated by this 
Agreement, the Parties hereby:- 
(i) call upon the governments that are hosting and/or funding external 
radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe to cease such hosting 
and funding; and 
(ii) encourage the Zimbabweans running or working for external radio 
stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe to return to Zimbabwe; and 
(d) that steps be taken to ensure that the public media provides balanced and 
fair coverage to all political parties for their legitimate political activities. 
(e) that the public and private media shall refrain from using abusive language 
that may incite hostility, political intolerance and ethnic hatred or that 
unfairly undermines political parties and other organisations. To this end, 
the inclusive government shall ensure that appropriate measures are 
taken to achieve this objective. 
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ARTICLE XX 
FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT 
20. Framework for a new Government 
Acknowledging that we have an obligation to establish a framework of working 
together in an inclusive government; 
Accepting that the formation of such a government will have to be approached 
with great sensitivity, flexibility and willingness to compromise; 
Recognising that the formation of such a Government would demonstrate the 
respect of the Parties for the deeply-felt and immediate hopes and aspirations of 
the millions of our people. 
Determined to carry out sustained work to create the conditions for returning our 
country to stability and prosperity; 
Acknowledging the need for gender parity, particularly the need to appoint 
women to strategic Cabinet posts; 
20.1 The Parties hereby agree that: 
20.1.1 Executive Powers and Authority 
The Executive Authority of the Inclusive Government shall vest in, and be shared 
among the President, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, as provided for in this 
Constitution and legislation. The President of the Republic shall exercise 
executive authority subject to the Constitution and the law. The Prime Minister of 
the Republic shall exercise executive authority subject to the Constitution and the 
law. The Cabinet of the Republic shall exercise executive authority subject to the 
Constitution and the law. 
In the exercise of executive authority, the President, Vice Presidents, the Prime 
Minister, the Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and Deputy Ministers must have 
regard to the principles and spirit underlying the formation of the Inclusive 
Government and  accordingly act in a manner that seeks to promote cohesion 
both inside and outside government. 
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20.1.2 The Cabinet 
(a) Shall have the responsibility to evaluate and adopt all government policies 
and the consequential programmes; 
(b) Shall, subject to approval by Parliament, allocate the financial resources for 
the  implementation of such policies and programmes; 
 (c) Shall have the responsibility to prepare and present to Parliament, all such 
legislation and other instruments as may be necessary to implement the policies 
and programmes of the National Executive; 
(d) Shall, except where the Constitution requires ratification by Parliament, or 
action 
by the President, approve all international agreements; 
(e) Shall ensure that the state organs, including the Ministries and Departments, 
have sufficient financial and other resources and appropriate operational capacity 
to carry out their functions effectively; and 
(f) Shall take decisions by consensus, and take collective responsibility for all 
Cabinet decisions, including those originally initiated individually by any member 
of Cabinet. 
(g) The President and the Prime Minister will agree on the allocation of Ministries 
between them for the purpose of day-to-day supervision. 
 
20.1.3 The President 
(a) chairs Cabinet; 
(b) exercises executive authority; 
(c) shall exercise his/her powers subject to the provisions of the Constitution; 
(d) can, subject to the Constitution, declare war and make peace; 
(e) can, subject to the Constitution, proclaim and terminate martial law; 
(f) confers honours and precedence, on the advice of Cabinet; 
(g) Grants pardons, respites, substitutes less severe punishment and suspends 
or remits sentences, on the advice of Cabinet; 
(h) Chairs the National Security Council; 
(i) Formally appoints the Vice Presidents; 
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(j) Shall, pursuant to this Agreement, appoint the Prime Minister pending the 
enactment of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment no.19 as agreed by the 
Parties; 
(k) Formally appoints Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and Deputy Ministers in 
accordance with this agreement; 
 (l) After consultation with the Vice Presidents, the Prime Minister and the Deputy 
Prime Ministers, allocates Ministerial portfolios in accordance with this 
Agreement; 
(m) accredits, receives and recognizes diplomatic agents and consular officers; 
(n) appoints independent Constitutional Commissions in terms of the 
Constitution; 
(o) appoints service/executive Commissions in terms of the Constitution and in 
consultation with the Prime Minister; 
(p) in consultation with the Prime Minister, makes key appointments the 
President is required to make under and in terms of the Constitution or any Act of 
Parliament; 
(q) may, acting in consultation with the Prime Minister, dissolve Parliament; 
(r) must be kept fully informed by the Prime Minister on the general conduct of 
the government business and; 
(s) shall be furnished with such information as he/she may request in respect of 
any particular matter relating to the government, and may advise the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet in this regard. 
 
20.1.4 The Prime Minister 
(a) chairs the Council of Ministers and is the Deputy Chairperson of Cabinet; 
(b) exercises executive authority; 
(c) shall oversee the formulation of government policies by the Cabinet; 
(d) shall ensure that the policies so formulated are implemented by the entirety of 
government; 
(e) shall ensure that the Ministers develop appropriate implementation plans to 
give effect to the policies decided by Cabinet: in this regard, the Ministers will 
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report to the Prime Minister on all issues relating to the implementation of such 
policies and plans; 
(f) shall ensure that the legislation necessary to enable the government to carry 
out its functions is in place: in this regard, he/she shall have the responsibility to 
discharge the functions of the Leader of Government Business in Parliament; 
(g) shall be a member of the National Security Council; 
 (h) may be assigned such additional functions as are necessary further to 
enhance the work of the Inclusive Government; 
(i) shall, to ensure the effective execution of these tasks, be assisted by Deputy 
Prime Ministers; and 
(j) shall report regularly to the President and Parliament. 
 
20.1.5 Council of Ministers 
To ensure that the Prime Minister properly discharges his responsibility to 
oversee the implementation of the work of government, there shall be a Council 
of Ministers consisting of all the Cabinet Ministers, chaired by the Prime Minister, 
whose functions shall be: 
(a) to assess the implementation of Cabinet decisions; 
(b) to assist the Prime Minister to attend to matters of coordination in the 
government; 
(c) to enable the Prime Minister to receive briefings from the Cabinet 
Committees; 
(d) to make progress reports to Cabinet on matters of implementation of Cabinet 
decisions; 
(e) to receive and consider reports from the Committee responsible for the 
periodic review mechanism; and 
(f) to make progress reports to Cabinet on matters related to the periodic review 
mechanism. 
 
20.1.6 Composition of the Executive 
(1) There shall be a President, which Office shall continue to be occupied by 
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President Robert Gabriel Mugabe. 
(2) There shall be two (2) Vice Presidents, who will be nominated by the 
President  and/or Zanu-PF. 
 (3) There shall be a Prime Minister, which Office shall be occupied by Mr 
Morgan Tsvangirai. 
(4) There shall be two (2) Deputy Prime Ministers, one (1) from MDC-T and one 
(1) from the MDC-M. 
(5) There shall be thirty-one (31) Ministers, with fifteen (15) nominated by ZANU 
PF, thirteen (13) by MDC-T and three (3) by MDC-M. Of the 31 Ministers, three 
(3) one each per Party, may be appointed from outside the members of 
Parliament. The three (3) Ministers so appointed shall become members of the 
House of Assembly and shall have the right to sit, speak and debate in 
Parliament, but shall not be entitled to vote. 
(6) There shall be fifteen (15) Deputy Ministers, with (eight) 8 nominated by 
ZANU PF, six (6) by MDC-T and one (1) by MDC-M. 
(7) Ministers and Deputy Ministers may be relieved of their duties only after 
consultation among the leaders of all the political parties participating in the 
Inclusive Government. 
20.1.7 Senate 
(a) The President shall, in his discretion, appoint five (5) persons to the existing 
positions of Presidential senatorial appointments. 
(b) There shall be created an additional nine (9) appointed senatorial posts, 
which shall be filled by persons appointed by the President, of whom, 3 will be 
nominated by ZANU-PF, 3 by MDC-T and 3 by MDC-M. 
20.1.8 Filling of vacancies 
(a) In the event of any vacancy arising in respect of posts referred to in clauses 
20.1.6 and 20.1.7(b) above, such vacancy shall be filled by a nominee of the 
Party which held that position prior to the vacancy arising. 
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ARTICLE XXI 
ELECTORAL VACANCIES 
21. Electoral Vacancies 
Aware of the divisive and often times confrontational nature of elections and by 
elections; 
Noting the need to allow this agreement to take root amongst the parties and 
people of Zimbabwe; and 
Cognisant of the need to give our people some breathing space and a healing 
period; 
21.1 The Parties hereby agree that for a period of 12 months from the date of 
signing of this agreement, should any electoral vacancy arise in respect of a local 
authority or parliamentary seat, for whatever reason, only the party holding that 
seat prior to the vacancy occurring shall be entitled to nominate and field a 
candidate to fill the seat subject to that party complying with the rules governing 
its internal democracy. 
 
ARTICLE XXII 
IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS 
22. Implementation mechanisms 
22.1 To ensure full and proper implementation of the letter and spirit of this 
Agreement, the Parties hereby constitute a Joint Monitoring and Implementation 
Committee (“JOMIC”) to be composed of four senior members from ZANU-PF 
and four senior members from each of the two MDC Formations. Gender 
consideration must be taken into account in relation to the composition of JOMIC. 
22.2 The committee shall be co-chaired by persons from the Parties. 
22.3 The committee shall have the following functions:- 
(a) to ensure the implementation in letter and spirit of this Agreement; 
(b) to assess the implementation of this Agreement from time to time and 
consider steps which might need to be taken to ensure the speedy and full 
implementation of this Agreement in its entirety; 
(c) to receive reports and complaints in respect of any issue related to the 
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implementation, enforcement and execution of this Agreement; 
(d) to serve as catalyst in creating and promoting an atmosphere of mutual 
trust and understanding between the parties; and 
(e) to promote continuing dialogue between the Parties. 
22.4 JOMIC shall be the principal body dealing with the issues of compliance and 
monitoring of this Agreement and to that end, the Parties hereby undertake to 
channel all complaints, grievances, concerns and issues relating to compliance 
with this Agreement through JOMIC and to refrain from any conduct which might 
undermine the spirit of co-operation necessary for the fulfillment of this 
Agreement. 
22.5 The new Government shall ensure that steps are taken to make the security 
forces conversant with the Constitution of Zimbabwe and other laws of Zimbabwe 
including laws relating to public order and security. 
22.6 The implementation of this agreement shall be guaranteed and underwritten 
by the Facilitator, SADC and the AU. 
22.7 The Parties and the new Government shall seek the support and assistance 
of SADC and the AU in mobilizing the international community to support the new 
Government’s economic recovery plans and programmes together with the lifting 
of sanctions taken against Zimbabwe and some of its leaders. 
22.8 The Parties agree that they shall cause Parliament to amend any legislation 
to the extent necessary to bring this agreement into full force. 
 
ARTICLE XXIII 
 
PERIODIC REVIEW MECHANISM 
23. Periodic review mechanism 
23.1 Having regard to the Objectives and Priorities of the New Government as 
set out  in this Agreement, the Parties hereby agree that: 
(a) they shall constitute a committee composed of 2 representatives each to 
review on an annual basis progress on the implementation and 
achievement of the priorities and objectives set out in this Agreement, 
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namely: Economic (restoration of economic stability and growth, 
sanctions, land question) Political (new constitution, promotion of equality, 
national healing and cohesion and unity, external interference, free 
political activity, rule of law, state organs and institutions, legislative 
agenda and priorities) Security (security of persons and prevention of 
violence) and Communication (media and external radio stations); and 
(b) the committee shall make recommendations to the Parties and the new 
government on any matters relating to this Agreement, more particularly 
on measures and programmes that may be necessary to take and make 
to realise full implementation of this Agreement. 
(c) this Agreement and the relationship agreed to hereunder will be reviewed 
at the conclusion of the constitution-making process. 
23.2 The Parties will continually review the effectiveness and any other matter 
relating to the functioning of the Inclusive Government established by the 
Constitution in consultation with the Guarantors. 
 
ARTICLE XXIV 
INTERIM CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
24. Interim Constitutional amendments 
The Parties hereby agree: 
24.1 that the constitutional amendments which are necessary for the 
implementation of this agreement shall be passed by parliament and assented to 
by the President as Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No 19. The 
Parties undertake to unconditionally support the enactment of the said 
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No 19; 
24.2 to include in Constitutional Amendment No19 the provisions contained in 
Chapters 4 and 13, and section 121 of the draft Constitution that the Parties 
executed at Kariba on 30 September 2007 (Kariba draft). 
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ARTICLE XXV 
COMMENCEMENT 
25. Commencement 
This Agreement shall enter into force upon its signature by the Parties. 
In WITNESS WHEREOF the Parties have signed this Agreement in the English 
language, in six identical copies, all texts being equally authentic: 
30 
DONE AT HARARE, ON THIS15TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2008 
________________________ 
ROBERT G MUGABE 
PRESIDENT, ZANU-PF 
________________________ 
MORGAN R TSVANGIRAI 
PRESIDENT, MDC 
________________________ 
ARTHUR G O MUTAMBARA 
PRESIDENT, MDC 
In WITNESS THEREOF the Facilitator: 
________________________ 
THABO MBEKI 
SADC FACILITATOR 
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9. Appendix 2: Kenya power sharing agreement 
 
 
ACTING TOGETHER FOR KENYA: AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLES OF 
PARTNERSHIP OF THE COALITION GOVERNMENT  
 
Preamble:  
The crisis triggered by the 2007 disputed presidential election has brought to the 
surface deep-seated and long-standing divisions within Kenyan society. If left 
unaddressed, these divisions threaten the very existence of Kenya as a unified 
country. The Kenyan people are now looking to their leaders to ensure that their 
country will not be lost.  
Given the current situation, neither side can realistically govern the country 
without the other. There must be real power-sharing to move the country forward 
and begin the healing and reconciliation process.  
 
With this agreement, we are stepping forward together, as political leaders, to 
overcome the current crisis and to set the country on a new path. As partners in a 
coalition government, we commit ourselves to work together in good faith as true 
partners, through constant consultation and willingness to compromise. 
  
This agreement is designed to create an environment conducive to such a 
partnership and to build mutual trust and confidence. It is not about creating 
positions that reward individuals. It seeks to enable Kenya's political leaders to 
look beyond partisan considerations with a view to promoting the greater 
interests of the nation as a whole. It provides the means to implement a coherent 
and far-reaching reform agenda, to address the fundamental root causes of 
recurrent conflict, and to create a better, more secure, more prosperous Kenya 
for all.  
To resolve the political crisis, and in the spirit of coalition and partnership, we 
have agreed to enact the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008, whose 
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provisions have been agreed upon in their entirety by the parties hereto and a 
draft copy is appended hereto.  Its key points are: 
  
• There will be a Prime Minister of the Government of Kenya, with authority 
to coordinate and supervise the execution of the functions and affairs of 
the Government of Kenya.  
• The Prime Minister will be an elected member of the National Assembly 
and the parliamentary leader of the largest party in the National 
Assembly, or of a coalition, if the largest party does not command a 
majority.  
• Each member of the coalition shall nominate one person from the 
National Assembly to be appointed a Deputy Prime Minister.  
• The Cabinet will consist of the President, the Vice-President, the Prime 
Minister, the two Deputy Prime Ministers and the other Ministers. The 
removal of any Minister of the coalition will be subject to consultation and 
concurrence in writing by the leaders.  
• The Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Ministers can only be removed if 
the National Assembly passes a motion of no confidence with a majority 
vote.  
• The composition of the coalition government will at all times take into 
account the principle of portfolio balance and will reflect their relative 
parliamentary strength.  
• The coalition will be dissolved if the Tenth Parliament is dissolved; or if 
the parties agree in writing; or if one coalition partner withdraws from the 
coalition.  
• The National Accord and Reconciliation Act shall be entrenched in the 
Constitution.  
Having agreed on the critical issues above, we will now take this process to 
Parliament. It will be convened at the earliest moment to enact these 
agreements. This will be in the form of an Act of Parliament and the necessary 
amendment to the Constitution.  
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We believe by these steps we can together in the spirit of partnership bring 
peace and prosperity back to the people of Kenya who so richly deserve it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
